

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR MAIL

December 2, 1943

SIS #244

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/21/89 BY SP5CALOMS

Re: Juan Peron  
Argentina Sub. raive Activities - R

Dear Sir:

The Bureau has recently received information from a confidential source to the effect that Peron has recently been exposed as an organizer of a spy ring in 1938 while Military Attache in Santiago, Chile.

It is desired that any information which you may have in your files concerning this allegation be furnished immediately to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 12

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SIS Records Section

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*B. Kramers*  
 O. H. Patterson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CAG:FJS

64-29220-1X  
February 29, 1944

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH~~

~~Classified by SP5CWA/MS  
Declassify on: OADR 289,656~~

Mr. A. K. Dacy  
The American Embassy  
Santiago, Chile

Re: Juan D. Peron  
Subversive Activities - M

Dear Sir:

(U) From several different newspaper sources it has been ascertained that Colonel Juan D. Peron is alleged to be carried in the files of [redacted] as a spy, resulting from his activities during the time he was Military Attache in the Argentine Embassy in Santiago, Chile. [It is requested that you investigate in order to determine whether the above allegation has any foundation in fact.]

Very truly yours,

Mr. Francis E. Crosby  
The American Embassy  
Buenos Aires, Argentina

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

(Via Diplomatic Air Courier Pouch)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson  
E. A. Tamm  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Ladd  
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62 MAR 13 1944

RECEIVED ROOM

b7D

dear

Buenos Aires, Jan. 4, 1944

Happy New Year, and here's hoping that this year will see a few changes in these parts, if you know what I mean, and I'm sure you do.

Well, the march toward the complete corporate state goes gaily on. The obvious sequel to the dissolution of the political parties is the establishment of the "partido unico" the single party, which is in the cards for Argentina, just as surely as the soldiers and the priests are now running the country. And guess who will be the head of the party. That's right--our old friend, Col. Juan D. Peron, Under-Secretary of War, chief of the Under-Secretariat of Labor and Social Affairs (attached to the president's office but the chief of which has ministerial ranking) and so many other things in the revolution through which Argentina is now passing that he is without doubt the "strong man."

The dissolution of the political parties was in the cards, but it was speeded up because the government got wind of what the leaders of the Union Civica Radical (the Radical Civic Union, universally referred to as "los Radicales" or "the Radicals.") had a neat trick up their sleeves. The real leaders of the Radical party never have sold out to the government, although one or two of the key men have climbed aboard the Fascist band-wagon.

One of these was Eduardo Madariaga, one of the leaders in the northern province of Corrientes. You may recall that last month, the Radical Party called a meeting of its leaders in Baires. The purpose was to decide when the national convention would be held. Assembled here, the leaders sent a delegation to ask Col. Emilio Ramirez, chief of the police in the federal capital and no relation to the president, when, please, could they hold their convention? The answer was that they couldn't hold it now but if they were good, the government might think of permitting them to hold it in April,

FOR

~~1944. This was rough, the sort of answer that the Radicals expected,~~  
and it also decided them to go through with their "plan." The plan was this: to call a secret meeting of the party leaders and elect a real chief, something that the party has been missing since the death of former President Marcelo T. Alvear on March 23, 1942. Once the chief had been named, a manifesto was to have been issued in his name and in the name of the Radical party, bitterly attacking the government and announcing to the people of Argentina that, in the Radical Party, they had a champion. It was naturally expected that whoever was named chief of the party would go to one of the concentration camps in the south, and that the dissolution of all parties would follow immediately. But the thought was that, at least, some effort would have been made to crystallize an opposition to the soldiers, and to give some type of leadership to the now numerous but badly scattered and confused opponents of the regime.

As far as can be learned Mr. Madarraiga acted as a stool-pigeon, and tipped off the government. Among the other measures that followed the dissolution of the parties, was the immediate seizure of the party headquarters and the confiscation of all records and documents. These are now being examined carefully, and the steady flow of Argentines into Uruguay and Chile these days includes many Radical leaders who are getting out while the getting is good.

The next move up Col. Peron's sleeve is a law for newspapermen, which, as are most of the drastic measures adopted by the government, was largely copied out of the now discredited Fascist copybook. This law, which will be known as the "Estatuto de Periodistas," has been preceded by much fanfare over how preoccupied Peron is with the lot of the poor downtrodden newspaperman in Argentina. Everyone agrees with the thesis that his lot is a hard one.

FOR

~~And when Peron gets word of one like that, he pulls out all the stops. He~~  
is going to give raises, insure vacations with pay (already guaranteed by Argentine law, incidentally) improve working conditions, etc. etc.

This is generally the same line that he has followed in taking over the other trades and professions. With the exception, that the newspaperman's law has a neat joker in it--every newspaperman will be given a "carnet" or identification booklet, which will amount to a license. And Peron's law will amount to the institution of ~~licensed~~ journalism in Argentina, once the stronghold of the freedom of the press in South America. Without his "carnet," or license, no newspaperman will be able to operate. And in order to operate, he must be in the good graces of the government in general, and Col. Peron in particular.

Peron now has his private press-office, which operates entirely independently of the Office of Press and Information of the Presidency. This latter bureau is supposed to be the centralizing point, through which all official news is channeled. That supposition hasn't bothered the handsome Colonel any. He pays the Chief of his own press-office 1,200 pesos (approximately \$300 U.S.) per month--which is a dream salary for any Argentine newspaperman. The average salary for a reporter or a deskman is from 250 to 300 pesos a month. Peron's office certainly pays him dividends, for the Argentine press daily is filled with glowing accounts of what Col. Peron has done, and what he intends to do. Incidentally, the Baires afternooner ~~Critica~~, once the most violent opponent of the government (in the days of the Ortiz-Castillo), regime, now has been brought completely under the thumb of the soldiers.

Although the final draft of the new law for newspaperman hasn't been drafted, Argentine newspapermen who are well-posted on what the government

~~intends to do tell~~ that foreign correspondents and all others handling news will be included in the terms of the law. This seems to be a bit extreme however, since the soldiers already have the weapon of expulsion at hand.

In connection with foreign news agencies, the censorship set-up which the new government inaugurated recently has undergone a radical change. Under the old arrangement, any doubtful stories were sent to the Central Post-office where they were considered and then returned to the agencies with the annotation that they could be printed as was, with deletions, or not printed. This arrangement has been superseded by a new deal, under which nothing goes to the Post-office, and the censors who are posted in every agency and newspaper office are not allowed to kill anything. The general idea being, in the opinion of most agency men, that the government fervently hopes that all the agencies eventually will in an unguarded moment let something slip through which will give the government the excuse it has been looking for to close them all.

U-

The intramural feuding of the soldiers continues, and although Col. Peron is at present increasing his power by leaps and bounds, his two chief rivals are not sleeping. Peron at present controls the war-ministry, although he is only the under-secretary, and is doing his utmost to establish his popularity with the working classes through his dictatorship over wages and hours from his post as chief of the Sub-Secretariat of Labor and Social Affairs. One of his most repulsive demagogic tricks so far was to send out a few days before Christmas time a telegram to all firms employing more than 25 people "suggesting" that each employe receiving 200 pesos or less a month should be given a Christmas bonus of half a month's salary, along with a Christmas basket. This has been a well-established custom among the larger Argentine firms for years, but this year all the companies that made the gift



~~and gave the names were made to appear to be doing it at the suggestion of~~  
Peron.

His two main rivals in the government are Col. Enrique P. Gonzalez, chief secretary to President Pedro P. Ramirez and the man who is generally credited with running Ramirez; and Col. Emilio Ramirez, the Baires police chief, already referred to. Col. Ramirez lately has been holding his fire, and the struggle for power has been developing into a race between Peron and Gonzalez. Each of the three has his following among the army, and particularly among the colonels who made the revolution. Peron has been getting most of the publicity and certainly has figured more in the public eye than any other member of the government, but Gonzalez operates in a different way. He is content to let Peron have his pictures in all the papers and to have his name plastered all over the country; he works behind the scenes and is very careful to keep his army followers lined up, figuring, and rightly, that if it comes to a showdown, it will be the army that counts.

One of the curious aspects of the present dictatorships is that, as yet, there is apparently no censorship of the mails. Various reasons have been advanced for this, but the one heard most often is that the lack of such a censorship is due to typical Latin inefficiency. Another curious aspect is that no retaliation whatever has been taken against foreign correspondents who resort to the obvious ruse of mailing stories over to Montevideo for transmission to New York with a Montevideo dateline. The New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune and PM correspondents use this method consistently, and nothing has ever been said to them about it. Ray Josephs, the PM correspondent, told me in November that he had sent over more than 80 such dispatches to Montevideo since June 4, and not one of them had been touched, or even delayed.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Buenos Aires, Jan. 13, 1944

Dea [REDACTED]

The pot boils away merrily here, and the steam from the boiling gives off approximately 1,000,000 rumors a day about the troubles and the plans of the soldier government. These can be divided roughly into (a) those relating to international affairs and (b) to internal affairs. The first class probably is of more interest to you, so here goes.

The cardinal point of the foreign policy of the soldiers right now is to spread their theory of government to surrounding countries and to introduce fascist-military regimes in Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. They are now boasting openly that they arranged the Bolivian coup. Paraguay, of course, under Pres. Higinio Morinigo already has a fascist-military dictatorship, but its foreign policy is 100 per cent pro-democratic, completely distasteful to the Argentine regime. And Paraguay is safe for our side, about which more later.

FEB 3 1944

Liberal elements here view the establishment of the "southern bloc," long a dream of Argentine extremists in order to split that part of the continent from the U.S. and to create a "counter-sphere of influence" under Argentine leadership, as the most dangerous point of the soldiers' policy. Dangerous because the soldiers are playing on the vanities and desires of the pro-Nazi, fascist clique that is to be found in every South American army.

Example: on Dec. 17, three days before the Bolivian coup, five Argentine army officers were conducted to the Argentine-Chilean border by Chilean officials with instructions not to return. One of the officials was attached to the Argentine embassy in Chile. All five had been proved to be active in subversive activities, and there is little doubt that they were responsible in large part for the communique issued a few days after the Bolivian coup by the Chilean government that a subversive plot had been nipped in the bud.

Among the other evidence collected on them was that at a banquet with "Ibanista" officers of the Chilean army (followers of Fascist-minded ex-president Gen. Carlos Ibanez who is a perpetual threat to any legally elected government in Chile) they and their Chilean comrades were toasting the Ramirez government here and the "coming military government in Chile." Every since the installation of the Ramirez regime on June 4, there has been anxiety in Chile that the Chilean counterparts of Ramirez and his gang would try a coup on the Argentine style.

The Ramirez government is the object of the greatest admiration by the soldier-cliques in all surrounding governments, and the solid front presented by the 19 American republics in refusing to recognize the "Made in Argentina," revolt in Bolivia, generally is considered a defensive policy. Defensive, in that if any country except Argentina were to recognize the new Lapaz regime, the soldier-cliques in the surrounding countries, chiefly Uruguay and Chile, might very easily pull off another "Made in Argentina" coup. It is thus evident that the U.S. press, after having been so far wrong on the revolution here, has been 100 per cent right in its reticence to see any good in Lapaz since Dec. 20.

As I said before, Chile and Uruguay at present are the likeliest additions to the "southern bloc." Conditions, economic and political, are fairly unsettled in both countries, and although the present governments have undoubtedly been bolstered by the firm U.S. refusal to recognize Bolivia, it is not impossible that the soldiers may gain their ends in both countries.

On the other hand, Paraguay is solidly in the United Nations camp. As I told you in my Dec. 21 letter, Pres. Morinigo was a matter of evasion and circumlocution when he was here on his visit, but he promised nothing. He holds Paraguay in the palm of his hand through his control of the Campe

Grande army and air are just outside Asuncion. And he is sold on the idea that Paraguay's future should be tied up to the U.S. I've just talked to a pro-democratic Argentine who returned a couple of days ago from an 11-day stay in Asuncion. His praise for the work being done by the U.S. there was unlimited. We are building hospitals and taking other measures to improve public health, building roads, of which there are literally none in Paraguay, and have established experimental stations for the cultivation of wheat, corn, yerba mate (an herb from which the famous South American beverage mate is brewed.)

These deeds are building for us for the future. I've been in every South American country except Venezuela, and it is my personal opinion that the greatest thing being done by the U.S. below the Rio Grande is the sanitation program, followed by the agricultural-program--the keystones of any effort to raise the standard of life of retarded peoples.

An interesting thing about the diplomatic situation in Asuncion now is the presence there of Dr. Ricardo Bunge, one of the bright young men of the Argentine foreign office, now counsellor of the embassy in Paraguay. Formerly director of political affairs of the foreign office, he was "exiled" to Paraguay because he was the co-author of the famous Storni note to Cordell Hull. Of precarious health, he is expected to be overcome by the atrocious heat in Asuncion and resign from the diplomatic service shortly. Dr. Bunge was one of the formerly numerous people in the foreign office here who were 100 per cent pro-democratic and pro-United States.

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There are seven divisions in the Argentine army. These seven divisions now are commanded by colonels. It is still a "colonel's revolution."

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Internally, there is a great struggle for power going on between Col.

Enrique Gonzalez, chief of the secretariat of the Presidency and the man who runs President Pedro Pablo Ramirez, and Col. Juan D. Peron, chief of the sub-secretariat of Labor and Social Affairs. In my Jan. 4 letter, I told you about a press decree that was forthcoming. The decree was ready at that time, and it was Peron's decree. But he fooled around, and Gonzalez stole a march on him, issuing the famous Jan. 5 decree which gave Gonzalez rather than Peron the power over the press. The talk now is that Peron still will bring out his decree and that simultaneous with its issuance, the Gonzalez decree will be abrogated, or its terms (already in effect) postponed until Dec. 31, 1944. The significant thing about this is that the struggle for power has not yet been defined. It goes on day and night, and as long as it subsists there is always the possibility of another palace revolt.

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Next Feb. 20 marks the end of what would have been the six-year presidential term of the late Roberto M. Ortiz if he had lived. It is reported that the colonels who run the government are toying with the idea of proclaiming, with the usual fanfare attendant on their great public announcements, a "return to constitutional government" on that date. The soldiers themselves are not yet exactly clear in their own minds what such a measure would involve, but the basic idea so far is that, being a government of soldiers and patriots, this regime is "super-constitucional." That is almost equivalent to the English super-constitutional, i.e., 500 per cent constitutional, so that anything that they choose to do is legal and constitutional.

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The government continues its demagogic decrees. The latest, and perhaps most important of all, is the revocation of the infamous "ley de residencia," or "law of residence," a tool used by previous governments to throw out of the

country any foreigner whose activities or ideas the government found uncomfortable. This move probably was inspired by Peron, who, as you know, is doing his utmost to curry favor among the working classes. The regecation of the law is important, in this respect, because most of the professional labor leaders in Argentina are foreigners. Many of them fled the country immediately upon the assumption of power by the soldiers because they feared the "ley de residencia" would be applied to them.

Another demagogic step, which has brought forth the wildest screams from the Nazi papers "El Pampero" and "El Cabildo," was the dissolution of the nationalistic groups in the country. (The English newspapers "The Herald" and "The Standard" usually write this word in their headlines as "Nazionalistic.") Whether the dissolution is effective or not remains to be seen, but it cannot help but cause a good impression among the Argentine people, who are thoroughly fed up with the nationalists.

A man to watch in future news reports from here is Col. Eduardo Avalos (accent on the first syllable), who has been rising rapidly in the hierarchy of the colonels. He commands the Campo de Mayo military base outside Buenos Aires, the same base from which the troops were drawn for the June 4 revolution. Apart from the power which this gives him, he is gaining prestige fast as a policy maker. Col. Avalos is the man who, on Dec. 4 at the celebration of the sixth month of the revolution, called Gen. Arturo Rawson a liar and a double-crosser and got away with it. That should indicate the strength of his position.

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There was some sort of a plot against the government, nipped on Jan. 11, among the Gendarmeria Nacional (National Gendarmerie), a federal police created during Ortiz' period as active president to police the frontiers and

the outlying territories of the country. On Jan. 11, 14 officials of this outfit, including one general, were arrested and sent "down south." "Down south" here means that they probably went to the growing concentration camp at Neuquen. As far as I can learn, the plot never had serious proportions.

-0-

Col. Peron, who was once the Argentine military attache to the embassy in Santiago, is listed in the archives of the  as a spy. I'll have more on that in the next letter.

-30-



OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE  
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES  
SANTIAGO CHILE

March 21, 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

Re: Colonel JUAN DOMINGO PERON  
with alias Juan Peron

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

~~Classified by 58000ms  
Declassify on: OADR 289, 656~~

Dear Sir:

Information Remains  
Unclassified per State  
Dept letre DTD 10.21.91  
1048 DKM/CAL 2-3-92 #289,656

Reference is made to Bureau letter of December 2, 1943 requesting  
information on the implication of the subject in a spy ring investigation in  
Chile in 1938.

(From the Military Attaché it has been learned that) Peron arrived in  
Santiago on January 22, 1936 to fill the post of Argentine Military Attaché  
to the Argentine Embassy. He was relieved at his own request on January 19,  
1938 in order that he might return to his sick wife in Buenos Aires. Soon  
after his return, his wife died.

He was replaced by Major EDUARDO LONARDI, who three months later was  
trapped by [redacted] as he paid over some 75,000 pesos to a retired  
Chilean Army officer for some Chilean military plans. Subsequent confessions  
by the conspirators revealed that the author of the scheme had been Peron, who  
had contacted the Chilean officer, CARLOS LEOPOLDO HANIEZ HANIEZ, and offered  
him 75,000 pesos for Chile's offensive and defensive military plans regarding  
Argentina. Haniez agreed, but before the plan could be consummated, Peron  
returned to Buenos Aires. He instructed his successor to carry it out; so in  
April 1938 Haniez brought the plans to the apartment of a third person where  
Lonardi met him with the money. This third person was DIEGO ARZENO, United  
Artists representative in Chile, who was to photograph the plans brought by  
Haniez. Just at the moment the payoff was taking place and Arzeno was taking  
pictures, [redacted] entered the apartment and took the three men into  
custody. Lonardi was immediately released because of his diplomatic standing  
and returned to Buenos Aires as persona non grata. Arzeno was also allowed to  
return to Argentina, and it is understood he became a flyer and later president  
of the Buenos Aires Club Aéreo. How [redacted] discovered the plot has  
never been revealed, but, according to [redacted] they had known about it for  
some time, even arranging that Haniez would steal false plans.

Haniez himself was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to five years'  
imprisonment. He served only a few months of his term, however, being pardoned  
by the newly inaugurated President PEDRO AGUIRRE CERDA. For some time after his

RECORDED & INDEXED

64-27220-2

Letters to Berle, ONI & P-2  
cc - Crosby at Buenos Aires  
CA 88-4/28/44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

release, he was surveilled by [ ] who believed him still dangerous. This surveillance revealed Haniez to have many pro-Nazi friends and no apparent source of income, although he lived in very comfortable style. Because they believe he receives his income from an Argentine source, the police still maintain a loose check on his activities but, to date, it has not been fruitful. Lately Haniez has been trying to ingratiate himself with the American colony and has appeared at several pro-Allied benefits.

b7D

(U) This foregoing information was obtained from the Military Attaché and from [ ] who corroborate each other in all essential details.

b7D

Neither Peron nor Lonardi ever returned to Chile. When Peron became leader of the Argentine GOU, a local publication "Ercilla" reviewed his case, the only purpose being to glorify [ ] who had outwitted an Argentine diplomat.

b7D

Very truly yours,

*John N. Speakes*

JOHN N. SPEAKES  
Legal Attaché

CFT:RM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



CAG:FJS  
T-4/28/44

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~IN SPECIAL MESSAGE~~

Date:

In reply, please refer to

RECORDED File #64-29220-2

To: Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of State

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/2/84 209,656  
BY SP3C/oms

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: Colonel Juan Domingo Peron - Buenos Aires, Argentina

Information received from a reliable and confidential source reflects that Colonel Juan Domingo Peron of the Argentine Army, while acting as Military Attache in Santiago, Chile, was instrumental in promoting espionage activities on behalf of the Argentine Government. *Information remains unclassified per State letc DTG 10-21-91 1049 DM/ COL 2-3-92 209,656*

Peron arrived in Santiago on January 22, 1936 to fill the post of Argentine Military Attache to the Argentine Embassy. He was relieved at his own request on January 19, 1938 in order that he might return to his sick wife in Buenos Aires. Soon after his return, his wife died.

He was replaced by Major Eduardo Lonardi, who three months later was trapped by [redacted] as he paid over some 75,000 pesos to a retired Chilean Army officer for some Chilean military plans. Subsequent confessions by the conspirators revealed that the author of the scheme had been Peron, who had contacted the Chilean officer, Carlos Leopoldo Haniel Haniel, and offered him 75,000 pesos for Chile's offensive and defensive military plans regarding Argentina. Haniel agreed, but before the plan could be consummated, Peron returned to Buenos Aires. He instructed his successor to carry it out; so in April, 1938, Haniel brought the plans to the apartment of a third person where Lonardi met him with the money. This third person was Diego Arzeno, United Artists representative in Chile, who was to photograph the plans brought by Haniel. Just at the moment the pay-off was taking place and Arzeno was taking pictures, [redacted] entered the apartment and took the three men into custody. Lonardi was immediately released because of his diplomatic standing and returned to Buenos Aires as persona non grata. Arzeno was also allowed to return to Argentina, and it is understood he became a flyer and later president of the Buenos Aires Club Aereo. How [redacted] discovered the plot has never been revealed, but, according to the source of information, they had known about it for some time, even arranging that Haniel would steal false plans. *b7E*

Haniel himself was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He served only a few months of his term, however, being pardoned by the then newly inaugurated President Pedro Aguirre Cerda. For some time after his release, he was surveilled by Chilean Police who believed him still dangerous. This surveillance revealed Haniel to have many pro-Nazi friends and no apparent source of income, although he lived in very comfortable style. Because

MAY 1 - 1944  
P. M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Benton  
Mr. Mumford  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

they believe he receives his income from an Argentine source, the Police still maintain a loose check on his activities but, to date, it has not been fruitful. Lately Haniez has been trying to ingratiate himself with the American colony and has appeared at several pro-Allied benefits.

This information is available to the American Embassies at Buenos Aires, Argentina and Santiago, Chile.

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence  
Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

cc - Assistant Chief of Staff  
G-2, War Department  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel L. R. Farney

cc - Mr. Francis E. Crosby  
The American Embassy  
Buenos Aires, Argentina  
(VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR COURIER POUCH)

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ATTACHE  
Buenos Aires, Argentina  
April 25, 1944

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL  
VIA DIPLOMATIC COURIER

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/27/89 289,656  
BY SP5c110ms

Director, FBI

Re: JUAN PERON  
Argentina - Subversive Activities - M

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter of December 2, 1943 entitled as above, advising that information had been received to the effect that PERON had recently been exposed as an organizer of a spy ring while Military Attaché in Santiago, Chile in 1938 and requesting that any information in the files of this office concerning this allegation be furnished to the Bureau.

There is no information in the files of this office concerning Colonel PERON'S having participated in espionage activities in Chile. However, the Military Attaché advises that Colonel PERON is rumored to have been involved in such activities but that he does not believe there was ever any proof of this matter. He stated that PERON was Military Attaché in Santiago during 1937 and 1938 but was relieved of the assignment in 1938 for the stated reason of his wife's illness. His wife died later in the same year so there is reason to believe that the stated reason was the real one. However, also in 1938 Major EDUARDO LEONARDI, who succeeded PERON as Military Attaché in Chile, was caught by the Chilean authorities in possession of photographs of Chilean fortifications as well as a quantity of money. There was considerable feeling over the incident at the time and LEONARDI was, of course, compelled to leave Chile. Although it was rumored that PERON had participated in the collection of the photographs and other activities which eventually caused the expulsion of his successor, there was never any evidence of PERON'S activity along this line. Army's Information Remains Unclassified Per Army LTR  
OTD 9-14-90 SP8BTJ/CAL 11-13-90 # 289,656  
#317,429

The Military Attaché in Buenos Aires made a full report on the incident at the time it occurred but there was no mention in his report of Colonel PERON.

53 MAY 6 1944

INDEXED  
&  
INDEXED

64-27210-4

CHC

Major LEONARDI, who was involved in the plot, is now a Lieutenant Colonel and is on the General Staff of the Argentine Army.

Very truly yours,

*Francis E. Crosby*

Francis E. Crosby  
Legal Attaché

HKR:jet

August 16, 1944.

Following cablegram from United Press, Montevideo, Uruguay to United Press, New York:

QUOTE INFORMATIVELY IMPORTANT EVENTS MAY EXPECTED NEXT FEW DAYS STOP  
RELIABLY REPORTED GOVERNMENT (ARGENTINE) CONDUCTING NEW GERMAN SPY  
INVESTIGATION AND ALREADY DETAINED SOME TWENTY SOME WHEREOF DESCRIBES  
IMPORTANT RECENTLY ARRIVED SPANISH SHIPS STOP UNDERSTOOD <sup>Juan D.</sup> ~~PERON~~ BACKING  
INVESTIGATION AND PLANS BIG EXPOSE UPFOLLOWED DECLARATION WAR AGAINST  
GERMANY STOP INFORMANT SAID SHOULD DEVELOP SPEEDILY AND DEPEND PERONS  
ABILITY DOMINATE EXTREME RIGHTIST ELEMENTS STOP DESCRIBED MANEUVER AS  
EFFORT LIQUIDATE ONCE FOR ALL NAZI ELEMENTS IN AND AROUND FRINGES  
GOVERNMENT STOP UNDERSTAND PELUFFO CALLING PRESS CONFERENCE SATURDAY WHICH  
MAY ROUTINE HOWEVER WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY STOP RECALL RAMIREZ  
\* GONZALES GILBERT PLANNED DECLARATION WAR BUT OVERTHROWN STOP PERON NOW  
SEEMS HAVE SPLIT THESE ELEMENTS ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY STILL QUESTION MARK  
WHETHER SUFFICIENTLY SWING DEAL STOP CONFIRM RECEIPT HOLD FOR FUTURE  
REFERENCE UNQUOTE

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

84  
EX-50

164-29220-9  
F B I

32 AUG 25 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL NOTICE—This contains information taken from private communications, and its extremely confidential character must be preserved. The information must be confined only to those officials whose knowledge of it is necessary to prosecution of the war. It is to be held it be widely distributed, or copies made, or the information used in legal proceedings or in any other public way without express consent of the Director of Censorship.

BYRON PRICE, Director

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/25/89 289,656  
BY SP5culoms

78 SEP 2 1944  
232



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100 00

64-27-10-10

RECEIVED

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

1.3.4

NO. 0-000000

100 00

FROM:

(No return address)  
Montevideo, Uruguay (from post-  
mark)

TO:

Luis ~~H~~ Irigoyen  
Bellevue Palace Hotel  
Berna, Switzerland

LIST: None

LIST: None

Date of communication No date	Date of postmark June 29, 1944	Kind of mail Air	Mail No. 636	Register No.	Serial No.
Language Spanish	Previously censored by None	Station distribution DR		DISPOSAL OF ORIGINAL COMMUNI- CATION	
Previous relevant records  TRI FIN 8240/43-R	For interoffice use	To whom photograph is to be sent		H RR C RS Sent with comment to	
	To be photographed  No	Photo No.			
Division (or section) Pers.	Table 8	Examiner 64046	D. A. C. 64002	Reviewer J.R.E.	Examination date Aug. 8, 1944 Typing date Aug. 9, 1944

DR  
use only

COMMENT

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/15/85 BY SP5C10ms 289651

BULLETIN FROM THE ARGENTINE MINISTER OF WAR TO THE CHIEF AND OFFICERS OF  
THE ARMY

In a letter with no heading, no salutation nor signature, the following bulletin is enclosed (quoting translation): "Secret bulletin of April 8, 1944, from the Minister of War, Colonel Juan D. Peron, to the chiefs and officers of the Army.

"International State of the country: The staff of the government officials can be convinced and assured that the Argentine government, certain of the justice and dignity of its state, will not give in, in the least, in its concept of national sovereignty that it maintains.

"Internal state of the Country: Regarding the Socialist and Communist parties, they must be permanently considered as "sharp shooters" in the hope that they will be able to subdue the laboring masses to present an element of attraction or of suture in all the popular fronts or national unions with a democratic front where they act as idealist, but that get hold of the situation at the least carelessness on the part of their ingenious collaborators, really in advantage. Nowadays, one can be sure that the Socialist and Communist parties are sustaining political dalliances, more so with the Conservatives (now out of power) than with the Radicals, who are restless in trying to subdue the leaders of the revolution with the argument of the equality of national projects between Alan's party and the Leaders of the Army. Regarding the Nationalists, it must be acknowledged that they do not constitute an important group yet, capable of attracting the rest of the population to supersede the enthusiasms of the revolution in their aspirations. Undoubtedly, they comprise a young group full of ideals, but with little or no experience in the management of the state and in the political situation, the Minister of War and Officers to have the degree that is being taken by the government in the fulfillment of its task.

"First of all, the management of the government can not be abandoned, until the postulates of June 4 have been completely attained, regarding the public administration and the national recovery; as long as the future social, political and economic status of the world can not be clearly visualized and even then, it is necessary that the military government assure in the post-war, an organic continuity that will firmly guarantee the degree of perfection achieved. In this respect, it is necessary that the country, moderate the passions of her men and pacify the disturbed spirits due to the senseless



August 9, 1944 chm

Record No. SJ 57296  
Page 2 of 2 Pages

action of the political leaders. Shortly afterwards, the stage of integral collaboration will begin, which will make possible for all the sons of this land, to collaborate with loyalty to the common cause without distinctions nor party alliances.

"We soldiers must remain as we have had up to these days insensible, to the sinful insinuations of the politicians of either party; only in this way may we be able to achieve the union of the Argentineans, which is one of the postulates of the revolution. None of the present governmental leaders and specially the subscriber will or will ever heed to the call of the politicians which we well know where it will lead to and the degree of lack of interest and loyalty that are a likelihood of the facts as they really are."

EXAMINER'S NOTES:

TRI FIN 8240/43-R (March 5, 1943) shows ~~Credit Suisse, Zurich, Switzerland~~ (Y 3693) informing ~~Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires~~ (Bt 5000) that they had credited Luis H. Irigoyen c/o The Argentine Legation, Berlin with Sw. Frs. 7052.90 according to their instructions.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**SPECIAL NOTICE**—This contains information taken from private communications, and its extremely confidential character must be preserved. The information must be confined only to those offices which are directly concerned with the prosecution of the case. It is to be used only for the purpose of the investigation, and is not to be made known to any other public way without express consent of the Director of the Bureau.

BYRON PRICE, Director



FILE

WASHINGTON, AUG. 28. (ONA)--IN A SPEECH HITHERTO UNREPORTED IN THIS COUNTRY, ARGENTINE VICE-PRESIDENT JUAN PERON NAMED PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, UNDERSECRETARY EDWARD R. STETTINIUS JR. AND "JEWDOM" AS "OUR ENEMIES IN THE NORTH," IT WAS LEARNED TODAY.

DISCLOSURE OF THE SPEECH WAS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE 11-HOUR DETENTION OF AN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT, ARNALDO CORTESI OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, FOR USING THE WORD "RUTHLESS" IN QUOTING COL. PERON'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD ELIMINATE OPPOSITION TO THE FARRELL-PERON PROGRAM.

THE SPEECH WAS MADE LAST MARCH BEFORE THE FORTY-FIFTH INFANTRY REGIMENT AT THE BUENOS AIRES ARTILLERY SCHOOL. IT WAS REPORTED FIRST BY THE ARGENTINE UNDERGROUND NEWSPAPER PATRIA LIBRE AND READ IN THE CHILEAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON JULY 12 BY CONGRESSMAN PROF. GODOY URRUTIA.

IN THE SAME SPEECH COL. PERON DESCRIBED U.S. AMBASSADOR NORMAN ARMOUR, WHO WAS RECALLED FOLLOWING A JINGOISTIC ADDRESS BY COL. PERON ON JUNE 10, AS "THAT SINISTER PERSONAGE" WHO REMAINED IN BUENOS AIRES IN THE GUISE OF A "TOURIST." (PRIOR TO HIS RECALL, AMBASSADOR ARMOUR HAD NOT BEEN EXERCISING THE FUNCTIONS OF AN ENVOY SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAD REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE FARRELL-PERON REGIME AS THE LEGITIMATE SUCCESSOR TO THE RECOGNIZED ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL PEDRO RAMIREZ.)

HW435P

INDEXED

NOT RECORDED

Clipped 31 Sept 1944 Government from  
Night Report No. 1278, of Overseas  
News Agency dated 8-28-44

In utilizing the above material in any communication going outside the Bureau its source should be specifically identified as the Overseas News Agency.

For Bureau purposes evaluation of it should be with the realization that the news of this agency is received principally through leftist emigre channels, official and unofficial, and that its correspondents regularly take a slant consistent with such channels in reporting.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/25/89 BY SP5C110ms

71 OCT 2 1944

COPY:RJR

CAG:act

T 9-7-44

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 12-08-2015 BY: J56J54T94

65-15067-529

13

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

DATE:

TO:

Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of State

FROM:

John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT:

Juan D. Peron - Buenos Aires, Argentina

(U) From a ~~confidential~~ and reliable source it has been determined that General Peluffo received a letter from the Argentine Ambassador, Adrian C. Escobar, summarizing his opinion as to the effect the speech of Juan D. Peron had upon various individuals in Washington. A copy of the translation of Escobar's observations is attached hereto. ~~(S)~~

This information is available to the American Embassy at Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Enclosure

cc - Mr. Francis E. Crosby  
The American Embassy  
Buenos Aires, Argentina  
~~SECRET - AIR COURIER~~

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED SEP 12, 1944

65001 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

July 15, 1944

GUY HOTTEL, SAC, Washington Field

ARGENTINE ACTIVITIES  
ESPIONAGE - A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Argentina - Col - Argentine*

On July 13, 1944, Confidential Informant [redacted], whose identity is known to the Bureau, made available to this office a copy of an unidentified letter prepared by the Argentine Ambassador to the United States for transmittal to General ORLANDO PELUFFO, the Argentine Foreign Minister. This letter concerned the recent speech of General JUAN D. PERON, former Argentine Minister of War, and was undated. An English translation of this message is being herein set out for your information: *Gen. D. O. Peron*

b7D

"Through conferences held with several diplomats I can advise you that the speech by the Minister of War, Colonel Peron, made a very bad impression on President Roosevelt, on Secretary Hull, on the Government, and on a large sector of public opinion. When the Secretary of State held consultations with certain South American diplomats, he referred to paragraphs from this speech, especially to that part which says that from Argentina's point of view, it makes no difference who wins the war. In commenting upon it, the Secretary of State requested the diplomats to transmit this information to their respective governments in order to obtain their opinions with respect to this matter. All those who were consulted are agreed that the speech made a deep impression on this Government, in view of the special circumstances caused by relations with the Argentine Government and the present situation of the war. Reliable officials are wondering how it is possible to accept the statements of continental solidarity formulated by the Argentine Government, which contrasts with the attitude of the Minister of the Interior with regard to Ambassador Armour—the latter denied, but of which there is said to exist data of its authenticity—and with the statements in Colonel Peron's speech, which can be interpreted as unfriendly and contrary to the cause of the United Nations. *(X)*

"I also learned that the former Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, invited to his residence several of the Heads of the Latin American missions, in order to consult with them on various matters, among them the case of Argentina. The attitude held by S. Welles, who has founded a sort of second State Department on his own initiative, made a very disagreeable impression on the Secretary of State and the Mission Heads, who made known their displeasure in view of the conduct of the former Secretary of State. *(X)*

"The Ambassador from Colombia had a lengthy conference with me. mentioned to him the Argentine international situation and the friendly intentions of our Government, in accord with your cable No. \_\_\_\_\_. He accepted this with satisfaction and promised me that, using a great deal of discretion, he would *(X)*

*Classified by SP5-1110ms*  
*Declassify on: OADR 199, 156*

RECORDED

64-29220-13

SE 20  
26

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

DIRECTOR, FBI

July 15, 1944

GUY HOTTEL, SAC, Washington Field

ARGENTINE ACTIVITIES  
ESPIONAGE - A

(U) talk to the Mission heads, and as much as possible, to the State Department.

(U) "The Bolivian Charge d'Affaires had a conference with Secretary Hull and voluntarily mentioned our country. He told him that without Argentine imports his country would undergo great privations. (S)

(U) "The Ambassador from Uruguay, who is indisposed at the present time, tells me of a conversation which he had with Secretary Hull. He presented to the latter, in the name of the Government of Uruguay, ways for the solving of the problem, which were not outlined or explained to me. Perhaps you could obtain better information on the matter through our representation in Montevideo. (S)

(U) "I believe that the Chilean Government might be able to give instructions to its Charge d'Affaires in Washington to establish contacts with the representatives from Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil and Peru. These, in turn, might explain to Secretary Hull the necessity of coming to a satisfactory solution. (S)

(U) "Through my interviews I gathered that the 'plan' mentioned in my cable has not yet solidified, since it is mainly dependent upon the report which Ambassador Armour is bringing. For, seemingly, it is the practice of State Department to listen to their representatives. This was proved by the recent trip of Ambassador Warren to Bolivia. Some diplomats believe that Armour, after delivering his report, will remain as Assistant Secretary of State for American affairs. This should have been done on Armour's previous trip, and it will be carried out at this opportunity." (S)

65-3630  
BHM:CNS

FILE

ONA 2 MONTEVIDEO PERON

BY TOM NELSON

MONTEVIDEO, SEPT. 9. (ONA)--A YOUNG NATIONALIST LEADER HAS BEEN ARRESTED IN BUENOS AIRES ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRING TO ASSASSINATE COL. JUAN PERON, VICE-PRESIDENT AND WAR MINISTER, IT WAS LEARNED HERE TODAY. THE ALLEGED CONSPIRATOR IS A LEADER OF THE ~~ALIANZA~~ ALIANZA JUVENTUD NATIONALISTA, THE EXTREMIST NATIONALIST YOUTH MOVEMENT.

HIS ARREST CLIMAXED A FOUR-CORNERED CONFLICT FOR CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT INVOLVING PERON--WHO HAS BEEN REGARDED AS THE REAL POWER IN ARGENTINA--THE ARMY, THE NATIONALISTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION. THE CONFLICT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, IN FAVOR OF THE ARMY. PRESIDENT EDELMIRO ~~X~~ FARRELL CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION IN HIS SPEECH THURSDAY NIGHT WHEN HE SAID THE ARMED FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

COL. PERON HAS RECENTLY BEEN THE TARGET OF NATIONALIST AS WELL AS DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION, AND SUSPICION BY ARMY CIRCLES STEMMING FROM HIS OPEN WOING OF LABOR UNION SUPPORT. THE NATIONALISTS, COMPLAINING OF PERON'S ALLEGEDLY WEAK HANDLING OF THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION, HAVE BEEN OPENLY PROCLAIMING THEIR INTENTION TO REMOVE HIM "ALIVE OR DEAD."

ARREST OF THE ~~JUVENTUD~~ JUVENTUD LEADER WAS ONE OF SEVERAL ANTI-NATIONALIST

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 289,656  
DATE 9/25/89 BY SP5C/ldm

Clipped at Seat of Government from  
Night Report No. 1200, of Overseas  
News Agency dated 9/10/44

In utilizing the above material in any communication going outside the Bureau its source should be specifically identified as the Overseas News Agency.

117 INDEXED 164-298-14  
For Bureau purposes evaluation of it should be with the realization that the news of this agency is received principally through ~~unofficial~~ ~~unofficial~~ channels, official and unofficial, and that its correspondents regularly take a slant consistent with such channels in reporting.

55 SEP 26 1944

Carroll

MOVES BY PERON WHICH HE COULD NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT THE ARMY'S SUPPORT. OTHERS INCLUDED AN ORDER TO NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS TO CEASE THEIR ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE TECHNICALLY SUPPRESSED LAST JANUARY, AND REMOVAL OF SEVERAL FEDERAL INTERVENTORS WHOSE REGIMES HAVE BEEN MOST EXTREMIST.

HOW PERON SUCCEEDED IN OVERCOMING ARMY SUSPICION OF HIM AND REGAINING ITS SUPPORT IS A CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET. IT IS RUMORED THAT HE THREATENED TO USE THE WORKERS AGAINST THE ARMY AND THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF HIS ARGUMENTS WAS THAT FEW WORKERS PARTICIPATED IN THE CELEBRATIONS HAILING LIBERATION OF PARIS, WHICH HAD ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS. THIS ALLEGED ABSTENTION BY THE WORKERS WAS INTERPRETED BY PERON AS INDICATING THEIR SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH IN FACT HAS MADE THEM IMPORTANT WAGE AND OTHER CONCESSIONS FOR MOTIVES BEST KNOWN TO PERON.

THE DECISIVE ALLIED ADVANCES IN EUROPE CERTAINLY ALSO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN PERSUADING THE ARMY NOT TO LINK ITS FATE TOO CLOSELY WITH THE EXTREMIST ELEMENTS.

WHETHER ALL THIS WILL BE REFLECTED IN ARGENTINE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AGGRAVATED BY PERON'S JINGOISTIC AND ANTI-AMERICAN SPEECHES, REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

HW1250P



REB:mep

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET - AIR COUNTER~~

Date: January 13, 1945  
 To: Mr. F. E. Crosby  
 The American Embassy  
 Buenos Aires, Argentina  
 From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 Subject: COLONEL JUAN B. PERON; FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS

A highly confidential and reliable source has advised that Garcia Arias of the Argentine Embassy in Washington was recently asked whether there is any truth to the rumor that President Farrell of Argentina is going to take a two-month vacation. Arias, in response to this question, stated that he did not know the facts in the matter but that the rumor seems to have emanated from a reliable source and if Farrell does take a vacation, it will probably mean that Peron will try to take over the presidency. (S)

(U) It is desired that you immediately submit any information that you manpossess regarding the above matter. (S)(u)

Communications Section  
 Mailed 11PM  
 Jan. 15, 1945

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~


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RLB:DS

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
**United States Department of Justice**  
**Washington, D. C.**

February 13, 1945

Information Remains Unclassified  
Per State Dept LCTR DTD 10-21-91  
1048 DKM/CAL  
2-3-92 # 288,656

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Re: COLONEL JUAN DOMINGO PERON AND THE  
G.O.U. (GRUPO DE OFICIALES UNIDOS);  
-FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Acers \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mumford \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Starke \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Beahm \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/23/89 BY SP3C/oms

As you know, the State Department has requested the Bureau to assist in the compilation of data concerning Argentine activities which may possibly be used by the State Department in the preparation of a case against Argentina at the forthcoming inter-American conference to be held at Mexico City on February 21, 1945.

Clifton P. English of Mr. Fred Lyon's office at the State Department has requested information concerning Colonel Juan Domingo Peron and the G.O.U. of Argentina. It will be recalled that Peron presently serves as Vice President of Argentina, Minister of War, and also heads the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. The G.O.U. has been described as the powerful military clique which was responsible for the Argentine revolution of June 4, 1945, and which has been headed by Peron, enabling him to become the all-powerful leader of the Argentine Government.


Information regarding Argentine collaboration with German agents in political matters relating to Argentina and several other South American countries has previously been furnished the State Department on a confidential basis, particularly that information obtained from HDZ intercepts which have established activities by Peron and other Argentine political leaders. This data is not being set forth in detail in the enclosed memorandum due to its confidential character.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached memorandum concerning Peron and the G.O.U. be expeditiously forwarded to the State Department through the Liaison Section. It is suggested the State Department be advised that the memoranda previously furnished will supplement the enclosed data relating to Peron and the G.O.U. Particular reference should be made to the memorandum entitled "German-Argentine Collaboration", and the memorandum relating to Elias Belmonte, dated January 27, 1945, both of which deal with data from highly delicate sources and reflect collaboration with Germans by Argentine officials, including Peron, as well as political intrigue involving Argentine endeavor to foment revolutionary activity in other Latin American countries.

Respectfully,

C. H. Carson



Attachment



Green smudge in  
for Mr. La  
February 13, 1945  
From C. H. Carson

Chile- Foreign Military and Naval Matter  
Argentina- Foreign Military and Naval Matter  
Argentina- Security Matter- X  
Bolivia- Foreign Political Mat.  
Brazil- Foreign Political Mat.  
Chile- Foreign Political Mat.  
Colombia- Internal Security- C  
Colombia- For. Political Mat.  
Panama- For. Political Mat.  
Paraguay- For. Military and Naval Mat.  
Paraguay- For. Political Mat.  
Peru- For. Political Mat.  
Uruguay- For. Political Mat.

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**JUAN DOMINGO PERON  
and the  
GOU (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos)**

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February 13, 1945

COLONEL JUAN DOMINGO PERON AND  
THE GOU (GRUPO DE OFICIALES UNIDOS)

Introduction

There follows a summary of information concerning Colonel Juan Domingo Peron and the GOU (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos) of Argentina, which has been compiled from information made available by various sources in Latin America who are believed reliable. It will be noted that most sources refer to Colonel Peron and the GOU in a manner which would reflect Peron, the individual, and the GOU, an organization, as being synonymous.

The activities of the Argentine Government as reflected in Section IV of this memorandum are to be considered in connection with previous data of a highly confidential nature which has established the activities of Peron and other Argentine officials in attempting to foment revolutionary action in various republics of Latin America

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_  
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Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

February 13, 1945

COLONEL JUAN DOMINGO PERON AND  
THE GOU (GRUPO DE OFICIALES UNIDOS)

I. Juan Domingo Peron

Colonel Juan Domingo Peron, who was almost unknown outside of Argentina before the summer of 1943, is now described by most observers as the head of the group of military leaders who control the Argentine Government. Peron was born in southern Argentina in 1896, the son of a well-to-do rancher. In 1911, he entered the Argentine Military College, where at the age of eighteen he received the commission of Sub-Lieutenant, and two years later was advanced to the rank of Lieutenant. At the military academy he distinguished himself in boxing, fencing and track; was reportedly a good scholar; and was stated to have authored books on military affairs, one of which praised Germany.

Following graduation from the military school, he served at the college as a professor, later receiving assignments as Military Attache in Europe and the Republic of Chile. He was relieved from the post of Military Attache to the Argentine Embassy in Santiago at his own request on January 10, 1938, in order that he might return to his sick wife in Buenos Aires. Soon after his return, his wife died. Peron was replaced as Military Attache by Major Eduardo Leonardi, who some three months later was trapped by [redacted] as he paid some 75,000 pesos to a retired Chilean officer for certain military plans. Subsequent conversations revealed the author of the scheme had been Peron, who contacted the Chilean officer and offered payment for Chile's offensive and defensive military plans regarding Argentina. This matter was never reviewed until after Peron's rise in public life in Argentina, and it has been stated that the only purpose in so doing was to glorify [redacted] who had outwitted an Argentine diplomat.

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Colonel Peron was subsequently placed in command of the mountain garrison at Mendoza, Argentina, in which capacity he was reported as a good soldier and a strict disciplinarian, who was always liked by his subordinates. His thoughts toward the Argentine Army were described by a source who quoted Peron as having stated that "the Army was the purest, finest and most Argentine thing in Argentina." The military revolt of June 4, 1943, which removed unpopular President Ramon Castillo from power, placed the government in the hands of military leaders including Colonel Peron, who was designated for the position of Chief Secretariat to the Minister of War. At this time Peron emerged from obscurity as a middle-ranking officer. Since the revolution, his career has been most colorful in that he has advanced to the position of the most powerful single political figure in Argentina.

In addition to holding the position of Chief Secretariat to the Minister of War, Peron was appointed President of the National Labor Department on October 27, 1943, which resulted in the creation of the post of the Department of Labor and Welfare, headed by Peron, whose appoint-

ment was effective as of February 18, 1944. On February 28, 1944, he was appointed Acting Minister of War, in which post he was confirmed on May 4, 1944. Peron was designated Vice-President of the Republic of Argentina on July 7, 1944, which position he holds at the present time. He has been described as: "The Man of the Hour," "A Man of Action" and "The Little President of Argentina."

## II. GOU (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos)

The rise to power and political prominence by Colonel Juan Domingo Peron has been reported to be the result of his control and leadership of the GOU, this organization variously reported to mean Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (Group of United Officials) and Gobierno de Orden y Unidad (Government of Order and Unity). Many reports have been received concerning the origin and activities of the GOU. One publication has stated that Peron, while Commander of the garrison at Mendoza, was leading "a crusade for spiritual renovation." He was stated to have worked with a group of young Army officers who became known as the GOU; however, their activities were not publicized until following the revolution of June 4, 1943.

It has been stated that the GOU was formed in February, 1943, as a secret society within the Army, which had for its purpose the creation of a powerful group, which could speak for the Army. At the same time the organization had in mind the possibility of the Army's intervening in the government and politics of the country. This source stated that a central committee of the GOU was composed of nineteen colonels and majors with an inner executive committee of three, which consisted of Colonel Peron, Colonel Emilio Ramirez and Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez.

As described by an outside source, Colonel Peron's name has been mentioned constantly since the day of the June revolution. Certain hidden functions of the revolutionary movement were attributed to him, and it was stated that it was finally revealed that he was the Chief of the GOU, which consisted of an organization of sworn militarists, whose letters (GOU) signified government, order and unity. The GOU has often been referred to as the "Colonel's Lodge," primarily because the leaders of the organization were taken from the ranks of colonels in the Argentine Army, and as reported by one source, the five leading figures included Colonels Peron, Emilio Ramirez, Enrique P. Gonzalez, Eduardo Avalos and Lieutenant Colonel Tomas A. Duco. These men were described as individuals in the Army who possessed the most energy and who displayed more exaltation with respect to the programs and operations of the revolutionary movement. Other sources have indicated the importance of other colonels in the GOU, such as Colonels Alberto Gilbert and Elbio Anaya. Higher officers figuring prominently in the military coup included Generals Arturo Rawson and Pedro P. Ramirez. However, it has been indicated that these individuals were used by the GOU because of their superior rank in obtaining cooperation with military elements in order that the revolutionary movement would be a success, and were not, therefore, directing figureheads of the GOU.

### III. Rise of Peron and Role of GOU in Present Argentine Government

#### A. Revolution, June 4, 1943

Following the successful military revolt that was instituted on June 4, 1943, General Arturo Rawson accepted the presidency of the new military council on June 6, 1943. There was a great deal of dissension among the leaders of the new government as Dr. Horacio Calderon had been appointed Minister of Justice and Jose Maria Rosa, designated Minister of Finance, which was against the wishes of General Pedro P. Ramirez, Minister of War, and other military leaders. One version of the dissension between General Rawson and other elements in the Army was to the effect that Rawson had formed his Cabinet and revolutionary government without consulting rival military chiefs, and when he would not make amendments as demanded, his resignation resulted. There were also reports to the effect that General Rawson considered General Ramirez more qualified from an administrative and executive standpoint and, therefore, felt he was a better man for the position of president. General Rawson resigned as Acting President on June 7, 1943.

The Military Junta immediately installed General Pedro P. Ramirez as President following the resignation of General Rawson, and a Cabinet was appointed on June 8, 1943, including such personages as Colonel Alberto Gilbert as Minister of Interior and Brigadier General Edelmiro Farrell as Minister of War. The new Ramirez government soon cancelled the forthcoming popular presidential elections and several days later dissolved Congress.

#### B. Peron and the GOU in Revolutionary Government

One of the prevailing stories concerning the revolution and its organization, which also related to the resignation of General Rawson, was with regard to the part played by the Colonel's Group in the Argentine Army. Although only two colonels, namely Alberto Gilbert, Minister of Interior, and Elbio Anaya, Minister of Justice and Education, were made members of the official cabinet, in all there were at least eighteen colonels who were designated for important positions in the new government of Ramirez. Colonel Juan D. Peron was designated Chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of War. This position is described as a strategic office because it has control of the Army and enabled Colonel Peron to reorganize the officers of the Army in accordance with his requirements by effecting changes of commands in the various divisions and units. Commanding officers in whom Peron did not have absolute confidence were substituted.

The Central Group of the GOU controlled the most commanding positions in the Ramirez government through the designation of Colonel Peron as Chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of War and his later acquisition of the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare with its numerous ramifications, and his being designated Vice President in July, 1944. As was later observed, Peron was able to substitute commanding officers of the various garrisons of the Argentine Army in whom he did not have absolute confidence. Other posi-



tions held by members of the Central Group of the GOU included the office of the Chief of the Federal Capital Police, presided over by Colonel Emilio Ramirez, the Presidential Secretariat held by Colonel Enrique P. Gonzales and the Garrison at Campo de Mayo which had been placed under the command of Colonel Eduardo Avalos. Indications of Peron's control over the Army were reflected by a statement attributed to him to the effect that some 3,300 Army officers had signed resignations which were placed in the hands of the Minister of War as a pledge to their loyalty to the Government. This action, Peron was alleged to have stated, assured tranquility in the Government.

One source alleged that President Ramirez stated that the younger officers of the Army placed in strategic positions within the Government actually dominated the Government which was evidenced by the position held by Colonel Peron, Chief Secretariat of the Ministry of War, Lieutenant Colonel Enrique P. Gonzales, Secretary of the Presidency, and the appointment of Colonel Emilio Ramirez as Chief of Police. Thus, the GOU became strongly entrenched in the Government of President Ramirez, and it was indicated that the younger members of the Argentine Army would play an important role in future political developments.

In reviewing the Argentine Government under President Ramirez, a diplomatic source stated in November, 1943, that the present Government of Argentina is controlled by a small secret society of Army colonels, known as the GOU. This organization, dominated by Colonel Peron, a young fanatical Fascist, is associated with Colonel Gilbert, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who openly prophesies a German victory, and Colonel Ramirez, Chief of the decidedly pro-Nazi Federal Police. It was stated that they are supported by a considerable portion of the Army, by a small number of federal office holders and a group of ultranationalist personages representing fifteen per cent of the total population. The Government was described as being opposed by the working class, by political parties, by democratic newspapers and by most of the powerful land owning and commercial interests, as well as the university and professional classes and a large part of the Navy.

#### C. President Ramirez's Conflict with GOU and Peron

The Argentine Government under President Ramirez cannot be considered without incident in so far as it relates to the control by the GOU. Ramirez gained some prestige by his forcefulness in imposing his authority over the rebellious military clique, however, it has been stated that President Ramirez requested on three or four occasions that he be relieved of his duties as President. The source of this information advised that the Colonels' Group had insisted to the extent of threats that Ramirez continue to act, however, there was a feeling that this was a temporary condition and that at any moment Ramirez would be relieved from office. The prestige established by Ramirez appeared during the first part of October, 1943, to be establishing a greater extent of control in the hands of Ramirez rather than the GOU. The Argentine Navy was reported to have sided with Ramirez who was pondering over the question of a break of relations with the Axis. The decision of Ramirez and his followers to break relations with the Axis

appeared to have been the goal which steered the GOU to desperate measures and it was indicated that the personal position of many members of the GOU would have been endangered should relations with the Axis have been broken during the fall of 1943, as was contemplated by Ramirez. Ramirez at that time believed he could exert control over the GOU and it is reported that he so stated to his personal friends. Unconfirmed reports which were verified through subsequent events indicated Presidential Secretary Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez to have joined the forces of President Ramirez over this issue. As previously stated, Gonzalez was one of the colonels who was responsible for the establishment of the GOU. A crisis occurred on October 11, 1943, over the issue of a rupture of relations with the Axis which resulted in President Ramirez being forced to abandon his policy. Counter measures by the GOU which resulted in their successful move against the President included the dismissal and transfers of officers in the Buenos Aires garrison of the Army who were reported as loyal to President Ramirez. Tension in the Argentine Government again reached the breaking point during January, 1944, over the question of recognition of the Axis. President Ramirez was reported to have pledged immediate severance with the Axis, however, his chief opposition was again stated to emanate from the GOU.

On January 25, 1944, Peron was reported to have notified the President that the GOU had voted against a proposed Axis break. Ramirez is reported to have stated that a break was inevitable and indicated to GOU leaders that pressure was being brought, pointing out the fact that the United States South American Fleet was just off the Uruguayan Coast. Some hours later Colonel Peron is said to have called the President and advised that the GOU would not oppose a break in diplomatic relations with the Axis.

On January 26, 1944, the Argentine Government announced that it had resolved to sever diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. Numerous reports were received to the effect that Colonel Peron was opposed to the break in relations with the Axis. It has been stated that President Ramirez and Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez attributed such rumors and reports to Peron himself, inasmuch as he desired the Nationalists and neutral elements to think that he was opposed to such action.

The Argentine Nationalists thus suffered a second defeat within a month as the break of diplomatic relations with the Axis closely followed the Governmental Order of January 11, 1944, which ordered the dissolution of the Nationalist Groups. Peron, who was once considered a strong friend of the Nationalists, lost much of their support as a result of the Government's move in dissolving their organization and the subsequent break of diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. Various Nationalists in discussing the matter recounted that it was Peron who persuaded the members of the GOU to support the break in relations, and Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez is reported to have informed the Nationalists that the rupture of diplomatic relations was sponsored by Peron. The attitude of the Ramirez Government toward Germany and Japan was described in a statement by President Ramirez on January 27, 1944, at which time he pointed out that the break in diplomatic relations did not indicate that action against citizens of those nations would be undertaken.

A crisis again occurred in the Argentine Government on February 24, 1944, the origin of which dated back to the rupture of the diplomatic relations with the Axis. A majority of the younger officers for the Argentine Army were displeased with the Government's action in severing relations, and strong rumors were prevalent indicating a declaration of war was imminent. Considerable anxiety was caused among Army circles which is alleged to have resulted in the forced resignation of General Alberto Gilbert, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez, Presidential Secretariat. Colonel Peron, who had previously supported the diplomatic break, is alleged to have subsequently told General Dominguez Martinez that he was opposed to the break and that persons actually responsible therefor were President Ramirez, General Gilbert, Colonel Gonzalez and Lieutenant Colonel Hector ~~and~~ Vocat, all of whom he termed to be traitors. Peron pointed out that these men as well as the GOU, which organization they represented, lost prestige in the Army. The action of Peron and Eduardo Avalos in forcing the resignation of Gilbert and Gonzalez was stated to have forestalled all further mention of declaration of war by Argentina against the Axis.

A few days prior to February 24, 1944, President Ramirez indicated to a group of Army officers that he should stay in office for an additional term of six years. Ramirez was also reported to have made this proposal to the Supreme Court, however, both the Supreme Court and the Army officials were stated to have declined to support such a move. It was indicated at this time that a new Cabinet was to be formed and that Colonel Peron and Colonel Luis C. ~~For~~leringer, Minister of Interior, had submitted their resignations, as well as General Farrell having resigned from the Ministry of War. One source stated that it was believed that President Ramirez realized that a show-down was imminent with the GOU and that he was determined to divide the GOU with a Cabinet lineup which would bring back into the Government General Alberto Gilbert and Colonel Gonzalez.

On the night of February 24, 1944, a conference of Army chiefs met with the Minister of War, General Farrell, which resulted in the resignation of President Ramirez. When the Army would not follow President Ramirez, his resignation was submitted. The resignation of President Ramirez was subsequently withdrawn at the request of a group of high Cabinet officials and Army officials who after a visit to his home substituted in the place of the resignation a brief announcement that Ramirez had retired for purposes of his health and had delegated his authority to Vice President Edelmiro Farrell. At this time Colonel Peron called newspapermen to his office and stated the "delegation of authority" version of the removal of Ramirez from office was to be used in all press releases.

A version of the meeting at the Ministry of War which preceded the resignation of President Ramirez included information concerning a speech by Colonel Peron. Peron is stated to have pointed out that President Ramirez had expressed on numerous occasions that he would resign the moment he felt he did not have the confidence of his comrades in the Army, that this confidence had now been denied him, and that moreover, he was on the verge of making two appointments which were not in accord with the desires or sympathies of officials of the Army. It is believed that Peron referred to the proposed appointments of Gilbert and Gonzalez to the Cabinet, mentioned above.

D. GOU and Peron continue in Power with President Farrell.

General Edelmiro Farrell took over the duties of President of Argentina on February 25, 1944. The removal of Pedro P. Ramirez from the Presidency also resulted in changes in the Cabinet, including the naming of Colonel Juan D. Peron as Interim Minister of War; Juan D. Pistarini, Interim Minister of Navy; and General Diego Mason, Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs. Colonel Emilio Ramirez, Chief of the Federal Police, resigned with President Ramirez, and his position was filled by Colonel Filomene Velazco. Peron, who had been designated Acting Minister of War on February 23, 1944, was confirmed in this office on May 4, 1944.

It will be noted that through Peron's influence the GOU and the other military elements who originally assisted in establishing the revolutionary government in Argentina were split into hostile factions, with Peron remaining in power through the support of military elements loyal to him. Every crisis encountered by the Argentine Government resulted in a victory for Peron which enabled him to advance in position in the Government.

It will be recalled that President Farrell was appointed Minister of War in the original Cabinet of President Pedro P. Ramirez. Following the Crisis of October, 1943, Farrell was designated Vice President of Argentina on October 14, 1943. Observers stated that information had been received indicating the desire of the GOU to have Farrell in the office of Vice President in order that he could assume the Presidency in the event Ramirez resigned or was forced from office. While serving as Vice President, Farrell continued to hold the post of Minister of War, with Peron serving as Chief of the Secretariat of War.

The newly-established regime of President Farrell immediately encountered difficulty with opposing elements in the Army. On February 29, 1944, only four days after General Farrell had assumed the Presidency, the Government was given considerable cause for alarm by an attempted revolt led by Lieutenant Colonel Tomas A. Duco, Commander of the Third Infantry Regiment of the Argentine Army. Colonel Duco, an original member of the central group of the GOU, was alleged to have become dissatisfied because he had not been named Chief of the Federal Police to replace Colonel Emilio Ramirez. Numerous reports indicated the revolt led by Duco was supported by a group of naval officers and civilians, who desired to overthrow the government headed by Farrell. It was also reported that the immediate cause for the movement was that on February 28, 1944, Colonel Peron violated a promise to the Army by relieving 42 officers of their commands. The revolt headed by Duco was short-lived and immediately quelled by the Government. Duco's failure was attributed to the refusal of sub-officers to follow him.

The unexpected coolness toward the regime of General Farrell by other American nations was described as a severe blow to the military



clique which had put it in power. This clique headed by Peron had been confident that its strategy in representing President Ramirez's abandonment of the Presidency as a temporary health measure rather than an actual resignation would circumvent any question of recognition. Farrell took great pains to refer to himself as "Ad Interim" President, and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Mason insisted that the policies of the Ramirez Administration would be followed to the letter. Colonel Peron moved into the Ministry of War, in which position he was able to keep a watchful eye on disgruntled military groups like that which conducted the attempted revolt under Colonel Duro on February 29, 1944. As an example of the results desired by the Farrell Government, it will be noted that the Chilean Foreign Ministry announced on March 3, 1944, that it considered the Government presided over by General Farrell as merely a continuation of the Ramirez Government, and therefore it was not necessary to recognize the new Argentine Government.

It has been reported that the Ramirez Government was removed from office because President Ramirez lost the support of the Argentine military group which had placed him in power, primarily over the issue of declaring war against the Axis. Peron's opposition to the declaration of war was stated to have forced the resignation of Ramirez. Peron's success in this regard was stated to indicate his influence to be absolute, based upon the following policies: In internal matters, paternalism toward the needy, and an arbitrary attitude toward capitalists, upon whom, both individually and collectively, obligations have been imposed. With respect to foreign affairs, Peron's policy was described as necessitating an increase of military and economic power in order to impose Argentina's will on the Continent.

At a meeting of officers stationed at Campo de Mayo, called by Colonel Peron on March 14, 1944, he spoke to the officers for some two and a half hours, stating that the Government knew that they, as military men, were not capable of governing the country and their sole purpose was to rid the country of thieves and political scoundrels, purifying the political parties so that the elections when held would enable the Argentine people to place decent and worth-while representatives in Government positions. It was further alleged that he advised those in attendance with regard to the request which certain generals had made for an interview with the President for the purpose of hastening an election. However, he pointed out that the other officers could understand that the generals were old - more in the decline of life - and that they did not even know what they wanted. Argentina was described by Peron as a country for the Argentinians. It was not leaning toward Nazism, Fascism, nor any organization directed by foreign elements, nor was it leaning toward Allied pressure. He stated that in Argentina there are four forces - the Army, the laborers, the politicians, and the universities. The first two were said to be of interest to the Government and he stated that alliance with the workers should be maintained because "If we would be strong, the more allies we should have." In connection with the international policy of the Government

he stated the triumph in this field could not be denied. He stated that the Allies wanted Argentina to break with the Axis, and that they had; and that the real enemies of Argentina were in the North. He pointed out that diplomats remain in Argentina as tourists, but after six months have passed "We will say to them - either recognize our Government or we will hand you your passports." In this connection Peron remarked that Argentina would show the world that her people are civil and sincere and that she will keep her contracts in spite of all possible opposition.

The generals of the Argentine Army who visited President Farrell on March 22, 1944, were stated to be the same Army leaders who had contacted Colonel Peron at the Ministry of War during the preceding week. At that time Peron is reported to have stated to the group that, in view of the military character of the Revolutionary Government it was indispensable that the Government have frank and loyal cooperation from its highest officers in order not to give rise to doubts in any quarter of the unity and solidarity of the Army officials. The source of this information stated that discontent among the generals of the Army dates some time back, and is based on the fact that the GOU in controlling the Government has diminished their prestige, disrupted discipline within the Army, and deliberately overlooked the wishes of the generals in regard to the problems of the Government, even those which affect the Army.

Subsequent developments involving personalities in the Argentine Government include the appointment of Brigadier General Orlando L. Peluffo as Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 20, 1944. Colonel Peron was made Vice President by Presidential Decree on July 7, 1944, and although serving as Vice President, Peron retained the posts of Minister of War and Secretary of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. The action of the Argentine Government in designating Peron as Vice President was reported by observers as a step for Peron toward the Presidency.

Foreign Minister Peluffo, an ultranationalist, was regarded as an individual who would not serve the best interests of Peron, and Peron was allegedly making suggestions for the appointment of a new Minister of Foreign Affairs as early as August, 1944. Young Army officers were reportedly irritated with Peron and Peluffo because they were trying to smooth the situation with the United States, and one source stated that Peron was threatened with ouster if he took action favoring the United States.

Peron on June 10, 1944, acting in the capacity of Minister of War, personally inaugurated a new course of study on National Defense at the University of La Plata. He stated that the defense of the nation was of direct interest to every inhabitant. He then referred to the failure of the League of Nations, which he stated was a Utopian dream, and said that this type of dream had invariably ended in another war. Peron pointed out that today a somewhat similar situation exists; that on one side the representatives of the New Order dream of continued peace which would follow the triumph of their ideas; whereas the United Nations also pursue the same

ideal and advance the same arguments. He concluded that war is a social and inevitable phenomenon and that the pacifist nations - of which Argentina is one - if they want peace, must prepare for war.

A document identified as General Order No. 11, signed by Colonel Peron as Minister of War contains the statement that the international order of Argentina follows a clear standard of conduct, maintaining with unbreakable dignity its national sovereignty; that the Government does not accept the hypothesis of recognition, but maintains its doctrine of legal execution within the constitutional structure; and that this thesis had been shared by Argentina's traditional friends, such as Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and "in an indirect form, by other nations which, without publicizing it, continue their customary diplomatic relations."

Numerous reports have been received regarding Peron's activities in political intrigue, which have prolonged his position in the Government and resulted in his continued leadership. Two powerful enemies of Peron and leaders of the ultranationalist section of the Army, Colonel Guillermo Celestino Genta and Lieutenant Colonel Julio A. Larios, have been appointed Military Attaches to the Argentine Embassies at Montevideo and Santiago, respectively. These appointments from a political angle were stated by one source as being indicative of exile for political opponents. It was pointed out by one observer that Peron had been promoted to the Vice Presidency of the nation through the potential strength supplied by the GOU. Subsequently the GOU became a real danger for the stability of Peron, inasmuch as a majority of its components were opposed to breaking relations with the Axis and aspired to the development of a violently nationalist policy. This source advised that Peron then enlarged the GOU, inviting to it nearly all of the officers of the Army, and in this way it was weakened, since the numerical factor destroyed the unity of judgment which had made it powerful. Even at this time, however, the nationalistic military groups from the garrison of Campo de Mayo under the command of Eduardo Avalos have been able to maintain a certain amount of control over the government because of the strength of this unit.

The Argentine Government, through Foreign Minister Orlando L. Peluffo, on October 27, 1944, challenged the position taken by the United States against Argentina by issuing a request to the Pan American Union for a meeting of foreign ministers of the American Republics to consider the policy pursued by the present government of Argentina. The Pan American Union, at a meeting of the Board of Governors on January 8, 1945, passed a motion wherein the Argentine request for a meeting of ministers was deferred indefinitely. This action resulted in a crisis in the Argentine Cabinet, which ended with the resignation of Peluffo.

Observers have reported that Peluffo refused to take action which would be irreparable as a result of the Pan American Union's refusal to convene a conference of ministers. The Nationalists of Argentina were



stated to have desired a course which would display an energetic attitude. Peluffo was said to be under pressure from the Nationalists in this regard. Many rumors circulated in Buenos Aires to the effect that Vice President Peron, General Peluffo, and other ministers had resigned. However, it was stated that President Edelmiro Farrell refused to accept Peron's resignation, and at the time it was believed that no action would be taken on Peluffo's request that he be allowed to resign, in view of indications that Argentina would possibly be invited to attend the meeting of American officials to be held at Mexico City.

Peluffo is alleged to have endeavored to blame Peron for the failure of the Argentine foreign policy, because of Peron's armament program and his numerous speeches which provoked distrust abroad and resulted in other South American countries failing to support Argentina at the meeting of the Pan American Union. The resignation of Foreign Minister Peluffo was interpreted by observers in Buenos Aires as representing a definite victory for Peron over the opposition of Nationalists. He had in the immediate past been endeavoring to eliminate centers of opposition among Nationalists in order to carry out his two primary objectives, which were described as follows:

1. To solve the international problem by securing recognition.
2. To arrange an alliance with radical elements to strengthen his candidacy for the Presidency.

This crisis also resulted in the removal of Nationalist Cabinet members and the appointment of Colonel Amora ~~X~~avelos as Minister of Agriculture, and Finance Minister Ameghino to act as temporary Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Nationalist Chief of Police, Filomeno ~~X~~velasco, was allowed to remain in office after he pledged support to Peron. However, David Uriburu, a Nationalist serving as Intervener in Corrientes Province, was removed from office.

Information received January 20, 1945, stated that reliable reports indicated over thirty Nationalist Army officers had been relieved by Colonel Peron of their commands in an effort to forestall any move against the Government.

It has been stated that Peron's position following the resignation of Peluffo is much stronger and that the extreme Nationalists have suffered a defeat in this political maneuver.

#### **E. Policies and Attitude of Peron.**

##### **1. Labor.**

The policy of the Argentine Government toward Labor under the direction of Colonel Juan D. Peron as Secretary of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare is described by Peron, who stated on assuming office,

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"I am a Syndicalist. The Constitution limits the number of Ministries, so the Government created the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare by Decree on November 27, 1943."

The structure of the Secretariat includes general direction of technical administrative services, labor, social activity, housing, statistics, administration, and legal services. Therefore, Peron has been directing matters relating to health, pensions, and immigration, economic matters, and laws relating to social security. It was through this means that Peron has endeavored to gain popularity with the working classes of Argentina.

Peron has taken an active part in the Government's Nationalist plan of labor reorganization. He has been skillful in his dealings with Labor and is reported to have gained some popularity through his settlement of strikes. Various measures have been placed in effect which have for their purpose to increase wages and improve working conditions of the various types of laborers in Argentina.

One of the principal aims of the Argentine regime as described by a source was to obtain the support of Labor through the efforts of Colonel Juan D. Peron. Jose Figuerola, Chief of the Statistical Section of the Departamento Nacional del Trabajo, succeeded in winning the confidence of Peron, who was impressed by the theories advanced by Figuerola, which followed the pattern of methods employed by the Nazi Arbeitsfront. It was alleged that Figuerola and Peron became very close in this work, and the former is allegedly credited with being the author of a majority of the Labor speeches made by Peron. It was believed by some observers that Peron through Figuerola would establish a new code of labor laws which would officially substitute cooperative syndicates for the once-free trade unions. It was planned that all central labor bodies would be outlawed, and syndicate organizations would be limited to a trade or federations of similar trades.

At a May Day ceremony, Peron, in an address, pointed out that since he had assumed the position of Secretary of Labor and Welfare, the country had witnessed the beginning of political and social justice in Argentina. He outlined the work which had been accomplished by his department, stating that construction had begun on 100,000 homes for working classes; that the printers' union had through his efforts obtained a collective labor contract; and that 200,000 railway workers had been benefited in obtaining annual leave with pay; increases in wages; recognition of their union; and a subsidy for the construction of a hospital, as well as other benefits. The employees' strike at the firm Grafa, S.A., Buenos Aires, which occurred on May 17, 1944, resulted in intervention by Peron. He declared the strike illegal and ordered the employees to return to work. When the employees refused to do this, approximately 675 were placed under arrest.

The Department of Labor and Welfare on May 21, 1944, stated that an inquiry had been made and that the strike had not been preceded by

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arbitration through the Department and for that reason was illegal. Peron's statement to the Press pointed out that his department had put all the weight of its authority in the defense of Labor, but that these laborers, who shunned authority and attempted to take matters in their own hands, could only be compared with people who shun the Courts of Justice and take the law into their own hands. Employees were instructed to report to work on May 21, under penalty of being discharged for failure to do so.

On June 15, 1944, Peron signed a Resolution ordering the intervention of the Municipal Workers Union. He stated that many complaints had been received indicating that the union was no longer filling the purpose for which it was created, and that it was being used to spread dissatisfaction and was allowing the infiltration of professional agitators. Observers have stated this instance to be a good example of the tactics used by Peron with regard to labor unions.

The Department of Immigration, which was placed under Peron's control in the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare, has enabled Peron to promote a plan for immigration in a liberal manner. Peron is credited with the desire to increase the population of Argentina to a total of 20,000,000 inhabitants within the next ten years. It is reported that immigration will be favored from the following countries: Switzerland, Holland, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and some of the smaller countries in Central Europe. Peron is stated not to be opposed to any given nationality or race, except that, when asked if he would open the gates of Argentina to Japanese immigrants, he replied, "No. What do we want with those monkeys?"

## 2. Argentine Army.

The policy of Peron as Minister of War is reflected in the decrees relating to conscription for civilians. Peron in a Press Conference on November 17, 1944, stated,

"Former laws were inadequate for the purposes of the Army. The new regulations have been drawn up in accordance with the lessons taught by the present world conflict, which show us that not only is it necessary to prepare the Army, but the entire nation, as present-day wars are not only military but also political and social.

"In the new law relating to conscription it is stipulated there shall be Pre-Conscription, Conscription, and Post-Conscription for civilians beginning with boys at the age of twelve, who will be disciplined in the Gymnasium for a healthy life so that when they reach military age they will constitute a vigorous manhood. The position of General of the Army has been introduced in the Table of Organization of the Army, who will actually be the Commander in Chief. Aviation will be considered a separate Army instead of a part of the Army and Navy."

Peron also revealed at this time that the plans for Army reorganization included the establishment of a Women's Auxiliary Service.

At a Press Conference held October 21, 1944, Peron spoke with regard to the Army, saying that before June 4, 1943, it had lacked even uniforms and ammunition for target practice, but that it had been reorganized and revitalized along lines laid down by General Farrell when he was Minister of War. It was stated that emphasis thus far had been on quantity, with emphasis on quality to follow. It was at this time that Peron indicated that the Army might function with its full complement of officers by January 1, 1945. Observing that possibly all officers would return to their respective units, he stated that the Army must be rejuvenated and an opportunity made to turn commands over to young men. Peron is quoted as having stated,

"Even I intend to devote myself primarily to Army affairs."

### 3. Other Activities.

The Press of Argentina was strictly controlled for a time, but is now described as being much freer in its sphere of action, although not totally free from Government supervision. General Peluffo when Foreign Minister was quoted as having stated that they could not close the ultra-nationalist and pro-Axis newspapers, ~~"El Federal,"~~ ~~"El Cabildo,"~~ and ~~"La Fronda,"~~ because, "If we closed them, what papers will the Army read?"

The Japanese Ambassador to Argentina was reported to have addressed a select group of Japanese at their Embassy at Buenos Aires on Hirohito's birthday, April 29, 1944. At that time the Ambassador assured them that the diplomatic corps would not leave Argentina, and that Japanese in the country were not likely to suffer economically, politically, or socially. He said the present Argentine administration intended to establish a definitely totalitarian Government, under the leadership and control of Minister of War Juan D. Peron, who would become Vice President, and later, President.

Unconfirmed reports have been received that Colonel Peron, while visiting the German-owned Black-listed Bayer plant in Buenos Aires on February 18, 1944, made an address to the workers, and then a second address to a small group of executives and key officers of the plant. Peron, speaking in German, was reported as having stated to the executives that the action of the Argentine Government in breaking relations with the Axis was merely a bluff which had no significance other than giving the appearance of co-operation with the other Americas. He is further alleged to have stated that he had great admiration for the German traits of discipline and order. Peron was stated to have received a medal from the firm's employees at this time.

The Falange in Argentina was during 1944 considering the possibility of reorganization. Mella ~~Alfageme~~ obtained an interview with Colonel Peron on January 5, 1944, and placed the plan of reorganization

before him for approval. Peron is alleged to have stated that he could not authorize the reorganization of the Falange, even unofficially, since the policy of the Government was not only to suppress all political parties of a foreign character, but also to suppress domestic political parties. Peron suggested the possibility of organizing the Falange as a society or group relating to Spanish cultural matters, catholic in character, which could be used as a shield or front organization; although he is reported to have informed Mella Alfageme that he personally believed the more prudent course would be to organize no group at all. He pointed out that the Falange could and should render the greatest service to Argentina by collaborating with the Government in its policy of Nationalism, indicating one of the greatest contributions which could be made would be to identify, and watch the activities of, Spanish Red leaders in Argentina.

At a reported conference with the Presidents of the British and American Chambers of Commerce, Peron is reported to have discussed the Government's action in investigating the activities of the most important German firms in Argentina. It was stated that the order for the investigations had been made prior to Argentina's request for a Conference of Foreign Ministers. This action by the Government was seen by some observers as a corollary measure to the request for a Conference of Foreign Ministers and was regarded as a possible step toward complete Argentine rupture with the Axis. Notwithstanding this measure, the source pointed out that the German firm Siemens Schuckert allegedly received during October, 1944, Government orders valued at two million pesos.

Information was received in May, 1944, to the effect that Minister of War Peron had directed the establishment of a secret police organization to safeguard and perpetuate the present administration. The organization was allegedly patterned after the German Gestapo by Minister of Interior Luis C. Perlinger, and was to be directed by Peron. It was stated that every public office, club, hotel, bank, industry, and important residence would be staffed with agents and informants under orders to report financial, industrial, political and subversive information. Brazilian, British and United States businesses, ships, embassies, and consulates were described as subjects of particular observation. This report is in line with information subsequently received indicating the desire of Argentina to establish informants in all American interests in Argentina in order that the Government could be advised of American activities. Along this same line, numerous reports have been received regarding alleged Argentine agents in other countries of Latin America, including Ecuador, Peru and Chile, whose activities have been described as of a propaganda nature. One alleged agent in Chile obtained employment with a Chilean publication and was stated to be engaged in anti-United States and pro-Argentine propaganda.

It is to be noted that Peron was instrumental in the appointment of a commission of five men to serve in the interests of censoring motion pictures of Argentine and foreign origin.



It has been stated that Lieutenant Colonel Jose Antonio ~~Vila~~ ~~Melo~~ was chosen National Chief of the Milicias Infantiles Argentinas, a new youth organization, with the approval of Minister of War Colonel Peron. This youth group is described as nationalistic in nature, and is believed to have the sponsorship of numerous Government officials, if not the Government itself.

Many reports have been received regarding political prisoners who have been detained by action of the Argentine Government. Peron was reported to have stated at a recent Press Conference that there were only approximately one thousand political prisoners being detained, in answer to a question regarding the truth of reports that over two thousand political prisoners were being held by the Government.

The Overseas News Agency in a release dated December 20, 1944, quoted a statement of Peron made at a dinner party attended by prominent industrialists wherein Peron challenged Democratic elements to overthrow him. He is alleged to have stated,

"Maybe you have 95% of public opinion, but I have 95% of the Army. If you think you can overthrow us with your 95%, why don't you try?"

On this occasion Peron is reported to have stated that the Red menace is his principal preoccupation at the present time.

Peron denounces Communism and interprets the word "Communism" to include many brands of Leftism. He has been most vigorous in his efforts to suppress Communist activities.

#### IV. INFLUENCE OF PERON AND GOU IN OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

It was established through sources in Peru during the fall of 1943 that the Argentine Government was planning to form a bloc of South American nations which had for its principal purpose the combating of United States influence on the South American Continent. Many reports have been received indicating activities on the part of Argentine political figures which have verified the existence of this program of the Argentine Government. The connivance of the Argentine Government and the important political figures composing the Government, including Peron, with German agents in Argentina has been thoroughly established. Peron was alleged to have stated that the Argentine Revolution was continental and the first result was Bolivia. The movement was reportedly developing satisfactorily in Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and even Uruguay.

##### A. Bolivia.

The Bolivian Revolution of December 20, 1943, was aided by the Argentine Government. It has been established

that ~~Paul~~ Estenssoro conferred with Argentine leaders, including Peron, shortly prior to the revolt. Conferences with Peron were arranged by ~~Dionisio~~ Poianini, exiled Bolivian diplomat.

#### B. Brazil.

Colonel Juan D. Peron and Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez, representing the Argentine Government, have been reported to have confirmed an agreement whereby cooperation would be extended to the Integralists of Brazil in an effort to cause dissension and revolution which would overthrow the Government of President Vargas.

#### C. Chile.

The Chilean Government is known to have closely observed the activities of Former President Carlos ~~Ibanez~~ del Campo who, during 1944, conferred with Peron in Argentina on more than one occasion. General ~~Jorge~~ ~~Bergano~~ was also in contact with Peron while visiting Argentina during November, 1944. These individuals were mentioned in connection with reported movements to overthrow the Chilean Government. One such incident was allegedly scheduled to occur during July, 1944.

Colonel Peron is reliably stated to have been aware of the efforts of Ibanez and others who desired to overthrow the Government of President Rios, and it was stated that he had promised to aid such activities to the extent of giving financial assistance.

#### D. Colombia. C

Communist sources in Colombia have alleged that the attempted revolt against the administration of President Lopez was inspired by a Falangist combination with agents of the Argentine dictatorship. ~~Diogenes~~ ~~Gil~~, who led the military phase of the revolt, was described as a Falangist sympathizer, and it was indicated that he was a member of an organization formed by Peron for espionage and propaganda activities among other Latin American officials.

Senator ~~Augusto~~ ~~Duran~~, Secretary of the Communist Party of Colombia, at a Congress on October 4, 1944, warned that the ~~Alianza Nacional~~ ~~Revolucionaria~~ was an agent of the Argentine Colonels' Lodge (GOU) and could be expected to try again to perpetrate a coup against the Lopez Government similar to the one which had been unsuccessful in May, 1944.

#### E. Panama.

Arnulfo ~~Arias~~, Former Panamanian President, who was expelled from the country and has been residing in exile in Argentina, has been reported to be endeavoring to return to Panama. It has been stated that Arias



would be permitted to return to Panama provided he did not participate in political activities. However, it has been alleged that during recent months Arias has conferred with Peron in Argentina concerning a plot by Arias and his followers which would affect the Panamanian Government. This information was received from sources in Mexico whose reliability has not been established.

#### F. Paraguay.

For some time it has been obvious that there exists in Paraguay a powerful military group opposed to the views of the United States. This group includes Major Pablo Stagni, Chief of the Air Force, and it has been indicated that it was instrumental in presenting to President Higinio Morinigo data concerning a secret military pact between Paraguay and Argentina by the terms of which neither country would go to war except in defense of Argentina or Paraguay, and equipment furnished Paraguay by the United States would be made a potential reserve for the Argentine forces.

It has been alleged that the Argentine GOU undertook a movement of an international political nature whereby Paraguay would be removed from the orbit of the United Nations and particularly the influence of the United States and Brazil.

#### G. Peru.

Marshal Oscar Benavides, Former President of Peru, has been reported to favor the Government of Argentina. Benavides served until recently as Peruvian Ambassador to Argentina. He has presidential aspirations, and observers in Peru have stated that Benavides would tend to favor Argentina in the event he was successful in being elected President.

#### H. Uruguay.

It has been stated that the Argentine GOU was intensifying its efforts to undermine the President, Juan Jose ~~Amasaga~~, in Uruguay. The efforts of the GOU in this regard were alleged to have been directed through the cooperation of the ~~Uruguayan~~ ~~Herrerista~~ Party.

Tending to verify this information is the report concerning the visit to Argentina by ~~Herrerista~~ Senator Victor ~~Maedo~~ to witness a military review upon special invitation from President Farrell and War Minister and Vice President Juan D. Peron.

~~CONFIDENTIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

RLB:EHV

64-29220-20

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/25/89  
BY SP5C11Dms

289,656

Date: April 30, 1945

To: Mr. Frederick D. Lyon  
Chief  
Division of Foreign Activity Correlation  
Department of State

Information Remains Unclassified  
Per State Dept LETR DTD 10-21-91  
1048 DKM/CA2 2-3-92 289,656

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: COLONEL JUAN PERON  
ARGENTINA

Though Colonel Juan Peron, Vice President and Argentine Minister of War, publicly disavowed any intentions of being a candidate for the presidency of Argentina, information has been received indicating plans for a campaign sponsoring Peron for the Presidency.

It is reliably reported that

b7D

Figueroa is reported to be identical with the individual who in October, 1943 was to establish a daily newspaper sponsored by the Argentine Army. Figueroa was to be the editor of this publication which was to be known as "El Debate".

The above information is available to the American Embassy at Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

Director of Naval Intelligence  
Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

cc: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
War Department, Washington, D. C.  
Attention: Brigadier General  
Carter W. Clarke

56 MAY 5 - 1945 41

Office of the Legal Attaché  
Buenos Aires, Argentina  
April 2, 1945

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

gc  
14  
Director, FBI

Re: Colonel JUAN D. PERON  
Foreign Political Matter

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to my letter dated March 15, 1945, in the above captioned matter.

With further reference to the possibility that Colonel PERON intends to be a candidate in the next Argentine presidential elections, the following information has been received from Confidential Informant  

b7D

b7D

RECORDED

ANGEL CUSTODIO FIGUEROA resides at Calle Medrano 581, 79-2783, Buenos Aires. There is no information in the files of this office or the Central Information Office concerning ANGEL CUSTODIO FIGUEROA, but the Military Attaché reported on October 19, 1943, that a daily newspaper would appear the following week, sponsored by the Argentine Army and named "EL DEBATE". It was stated that the editor of this paper would be a certain Dr. FIGUEROA.

Efforts are being made to obtain a copy of the above mentioned book.

The above mentioned information is being made available to the Embassy in Buenos Aires.

Very truly yours,

James P. Joice, Jr.  
LA

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/23/89 289656  
BY SP5CJL/MS

HKR:WOW  
109-13

Office of the Legal Attaché  
Buenos Aires, Argentina  
March 15, 1945

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

Director, FBI

Re: Colonel Juan D. Peron  
Foreign Political Matter

~~Classified by Sections~~  
~~Declassify on: OADR 289,156~~

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated January 13, 1945, advising that information had been received from a highly confidential and reliable source to the effect that [REDACTED]

b7D

(U) [REDACTED] (S)

With respect to this matter, General FARRELL did take a short vacation in Mar del Plata around the first of February and upon his return was ill for several days with bronchitis. During January the rumor had circulated that he would take an extended vacation, and at the time of his trip to Mar del Plata and his subsequent illness, it was rumored even more strongly that he would not return to the Presidency; however, he did return after a few days and has been attending to his duties regularly since that time. There is now no indication that he plans an extended absence. (S)

(U) [REDACTED] (S)

With regard to the conjecture that PERON would step in and take over the Government on FARRELL's being absent, most informed observers believe that Colonel PERON is desirous of avoiding such a move at all costs inasmuch as he aspires to be elected to the office of the President, and under the Argentine constitution he could not be elected if he had previously acted as President. (S)

Information on this matter has been received from Confidential Informant [REDACTED] who stated that [REDACTED]

b7D

56 MAY 11 1945

- 1 EX - 37  
~~SECRET~~

RECORDED & INDEXED

64-273-21

~~SECRET~~

(U)

b7D

Other indications that Colonel PERON intends to be a candidate for the office of President appeared in the newspapers on March 12, 1945, when he denied certain statements attributed to him by the newspaper woman, CONCEPCION RIOS, and pointed out that the organic law of the Argentine Army and the regulations of the Army do not prevent a soldier in active service from holding the office of President of the Republic. He has stated on two occasions to newspaper men that he will take the office if it is offered to him inasmuch as it is his belief that "man cannot escape his destiny".

Very truly yours,

*James P. Joice, Jr.*  
James P. Joice, Jr.,  
L. A.

HKR:Eow  
109-13

~~SECRET~~

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT Buenos Aires, Argentina

FILE No. 109-13 ems

REPORT MADE AT BUENOS AIRES	DATE WHEN MADE 8-14-45	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 4-13, 17, 20, 5-10, 24, 6-10, 13, 24, 8-4, 6, 7-45	REPORT MADE BY Howard K. Rutherford
TITLE COLONEL JUAN D. PERON			CHARACTER OF CASE Foreign Political Matter

## SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

PERON, indisputable force of present military government, is probable candidate for president in next elections. He has support of armed forces, who desire safeguard against recriminations, also has won some support from labor and in the Radical Party. He has the opposition of the Conservative and Socialist Parties and all important leaders of the Radical Party, also of industry, commerce, agriculture, professional groups, and the press. There are no serious differences within government nor within opposition, but serious difficulties foreseen for coalition of opposition forces. Only chance of return to normalcy under Peron would be through honest elections and this only possible if he secures following of enough Radical Party leaders to guarantee support of a large party faction.

- C -

Information on  
Pg 3 of PG 21 Source  
is unclassified  
per Army letter DTD  
9-14-90  
SP8 BTJ/CAL  
11-13-90

REFERENCE: Bureau cable No. 578 of 7-24-45

# 289,656  
# 317,429

ORIGINAL

APPROVED AND FORWARDED <i>[Signature]</i>	LEGAL ATTACHE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
MADE AVAILABLE TO	COPIES OF THIS REPORT	104-29220-24	RECORD
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N. A.			
OTHERS			
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INDEXED IN  
PUBLICATION  
FILES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9/29/89 BY SP5/LLS

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION  
58 JAN 24 1946

ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

No distribution of this report is being made since referenced Bureau cable advised that report was desired solely for the information of the Bureau. However, factual information contained herein has been furnished to the Ambassador from time to time as received.



August 14, 1945

Re: COLONEL JUAN D. PERÓN  
Buenos Aires, Argentina

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 289,151  
DATE 9/25/89 BY SP3/clm

Numerous recent events in the political field--the Political Parties' Statute, which went into effect August 1st, increased activity of all political parties, the President's promise to call elections before the end of the year, and the lifting of the state of siege--indicate the nearness of electoral activity and the interest of the present moment in the Argentine political situation. Moreover, the official propaganda in favor of Colonel Juan D. Perón, as well as information received from confidential sources, indicate that it is almost inevitable that Colonel Perón will present his candidacy for President. Among the many complex forces which make up the voting population of Argentina, Colonel Perón has won the support of some elements but has, at the same time, incurred the disfavor and opposition of others. His strength, his opposition, and the sources thereof will be seen in the following paragraphs.

#### THE GOVERNMENT

It is indisputable that at present Colonel Perón constitutes the fundamental force of the Argentine Government. He has been responsible in many cases for the appointments of other ministers and has their complete loyalty. In addition, he has, as Minister of War, the control of the armed forces which constitute the backbone of the government's strength, and for that reason other ministers hesitate to oppose him, lest they be deposed. The Argentine man on the street knows that this is the situation and thinks and speaks of the government as identical with Colonel Juan Perón. Whether criticizing or praising, or merely commenting on the acts of the government, he attributes them to Perón.

Among the cabinet ministers those who are completely loyal to Perón are the Minister of Finance, ALONSO XIRIGUYEN; the Minister of the Interior, ALBERTO XTEISAIRE; the Minister of Agriculture, Colonel (retired) AMARO XAVALOS; the Secretary of Industry and Commerce, Lieutenant Colonel MARIANO XABARCA;

*Morison*  
and the Secretary of Aeronautics, Commodore BARTOLOME DE LA COLINA. Lieutenant Colonel ABARCA is a man of confidence of Perón and was placed in office after a dispute between him and General JULIO CECCHI, former Secretary of Industry and Commerce, whose department ABARCA had been appointed to investigate.

The only cabinet ministers who do not completely support Colonel Perón are Dr. CESAR AMEGHINO and General JUAN PISTARINI, and both of these men have been careful to be most discreet in their opposition. Dr. AMEGHINO belongs to the PARTIDO DEMOCRATA NACIONAL (Conservative Party) and owes his political success to the Conservative boss of Avellaneda, ALBERTO BARCELO. He is not in sympathy with the leftist policies of Perón. General PISTARINI is a man of considerable prestige in the Army, strong willed, and a stern believer in military discipline, and for that reason he can never be counted on to follow blindly the dictates of Perón.

With respect to the President, General EDELMIRO J. FARRELL, he is a personal friend of Perón and an admirer as well. Source C states that FARRELL is easily influenced by Colonel Perón; however, he does not always accept or follow the policies suggested by Perón, a fact which is most irritating to the latter's friends. President FARRELL is responsive to what he believes to be the will of the armed forces, and whenever he is convinced that this will is in conflict with Colonel Perón's desires, he is inclined to follow the former course. He is also under the influence of his aides, Colonel GREGORIO TALBER and Colonel ARISTOBULO LITTELBACH, both of whom are not in sympathy with Colonel Perón.

#### THE POLICE

The Argentine Police are extremely well disciplined and respond to the orders of their chiefs. Although there have been rumors for some time that Colonel FILOMENO VELAZCO, Chief of the Federal Police, was not in sympathy with Colonel Perón, there has never been any evidence of ill feeling between the two. It has been stated by reliable Source D, who is known to have been in contact with official circles, that such rumors of dissention have sometimes been spread by the government itself in the hope that it would lead opposition forces to show their hand. Moreover, if at any time there should be difficulties between Perón and Velazco, the former has an additional hold on the police in the person of the Assistant Chief, Lieutenant Colonel DOMINGO MOLINA, who is Chief of the

National Gendarmeria. He is absolutely loyal to Colonel Perón.

#### THE ARMED FORCES

As has been mentioned, Colonel Perón has availed himself of his position as Minister of War to obtain complete control of the Argentine Army. In any case where the sympathies of a commanding officer have been in doubt, Perón has either replaced the officer or, when that was not possible, has given him subordinate officers whose loyalty was not in doubt. In this way even those officers who do not like Perón are compelled to be most discreet and keep their feelings to themselves.

Perón was, prior to the Revolution of 1943, very popular within the Army. By comparative standards, at least, he is quite intelligent, has considerable personal charm, and is often able to prevail upon his colleagues merely by persuasion.

He has, however, incurred the ill will of a number of senior officers due to his disregard for discipline and for their superior rank.

According to Source D, there is also the feeling within the armed forces that any civilian government which might follow the present regime would be likely to indulge in recriminations against the military forces, even to the extent of slashing their appropriations and investigating the activities of this government with a view to punishing those responsible in case such investigation should reflect irregularities. They feel that it is necessary for the prestige of the armed forces that measures be taken to preclude any such possibility. The only apparent means of doing so would be by having one of their number continue in the government. For this reason, in case of elections, the majority of the persons in the armed forces would support Perón in preference to a civilian candidate.

According to Source D, Commodore DE LA COLINA is most anxious to see Perón's candidacy succeed, as is General EDUARDO AVALOS, Chief of the garrison at Campo de Mayo.

Source E has also named Generals SOSA, MOLINA and VARGAS ~~as persons who support Perón's candidacy~~. This source named the following generals as among those who oppose the candidacy of Perón: JUAN PISTARINI, DIEGO MASON, LAUREANO ANAYA, and ERNESTO FLORIT. The same source states that the officers of the Navy are almost 100% against Perón.

Reliable Source F, who attended the dinner of camaraderie of the armed forces on July 6, 1945, advised that the speech of General FARRELL brought forth loud applause from the officers gathered there, especially when he promised that

elections would be held before the end of the year and when he stated that the Government was not preparing to choose its own successor. According to the source, Colonel Perón's speech received notably less applause and a number of the generals who were seated at the front of the room did not applaud at all.

Another interesting indication of the attitude of the armed forces was the recent publication by Buenos Aires newspapers of a document said to have been presented to President FARRELL on July 30th by a number of admirals and generals. The document contained six points which were said to express the ideas of those who signed it. These were:

1. They support the policy of President FARRELL as stated at the banquet of camaraderie on July 6th to the effect that the government would call elections before the end of the year, that the elections would be free, and that the government was not imposing its successor.
2. They do not claim to support or veto candidacies to the presidency, but they do not agree with permitting that election campaign be carried on from public office.
3. They declare that those who are to be candidates for the presidency should give up their public offices immediately.
4. They understand that the fundamental aim of the Revolution will have been accomplished when the sovereignty is restored to the people.
5. They trust that the political parties will bear in mind that it was a government exceeding the limits of real democracy which provoked the Revolution.
6. They agreed that a policy of social justice in harmony with the real needs of the country should be followed.

The signers of the document were Vice Admiral VERNENGO, LIMA, Rear Admirals GARCIA, POCH, SCIURANO, ZULOAGA, MacLEAN, DANIEL GARCIA, SMITH, CLARIZZA, PANTIN, BASILICO, and Generals AVALOS, JANDULA, SOSA MOLINA, URDAPILLETA, SOLARI, ALVARINO, VARGAS BELMONTE, YODICE, RODRIGO, MARTIN, MAJO, PISTARINI, MASON, LOPEZ, DAVIOA, LAUREANO ANAYA, TROTZ, PODESTA, KELSO, LOPEZ, SARMIENTO, BASSI, ESCOBAR, SAVIO, GONZALEZ, FLORIT, VAGO, UNCAL, GUGLIELMONI, and QUIROGA.

## PUBLIC OPINION

Among the Argentine people the actions of Perón are widely discussed. He personifies to some the government of force, the military dictatorship, the revolutionary continuity, and the lack of guarantees. To others he represents the best policies of the government and the gradual evolution towards normalcy. As mentioned heretofore, the man on the street does not speak of the government of FARRELL or the revolutionary government, he speaks simply of Perón and attributes to him all the acts of the government. The upper class Argentines, particularly the landholders and those engaged in business, commerce, or banking, are opposed to Perón because of his leftist social policies. On the other hand, the workers, whose sympathy Perón has tried to win, have taken advantage of everything offered them in the way of social benefits, but, in many cases at least, reproach Perón for what they consider the unjustified increase in the cost of living. The middle classes, which include the official bureaucracy, the white collar workers, etc., have an appreciable sector--although perhaps not a majority--which favors Perón on account of his work as Secretary of Labor and Welfare, resulting in an increase in salaries, the "family salary", the inauguration of retirement schemes, the reduction of rents, etc.

### The "Fuerzas Vivas"

*Edelman* The term "Fuerzas Vivas", which has been used extensively in recent weeks, actually has no real meaning, but it has been applied to the wealth of the country as represented by the large landholders, big business, commerce, industry, and banking. During the latter part of June, a number of organizations representing these interests presented to President FARRELL a memorandum in which they attacked the labor policies of Colonel Perón and his Secretariat of Labor and Welfare, saying that such policies were not only disrupting the public economy, but were arousing class hatred. This was the beginning of an intensive propaganda campaign during which Colonel Perón accused the big business, commerce, industry, and banking, which he called the "Fuerzas Vivas" of wanting to enslave the working man and deny him the necessities of a comfortable life. Thousands of handbills were scattered over the city setting out the profits made by the various large business houses during recent years, and some of the pro-Perón labor unions held meetings and put up posters, all in protest against the attitude of the so-called "Fuerzas Vivas."

Although the latter did not retaliate with any extensive publicity, it would and did purchase



advertising space in the newspapers to set forth its point of view. Organizations which entered in the criticism of Perón's labor policy included the Argentine Chamber of Commerce, the Argentine Rural Society, the Argentine Industrial Union, the Stock Exchange, and numerous local Chambers of Commerce and other such organizations throughout the country.

According to Source G, these organizations do not object so much to the benefits Perón has granted to labor as to the inflammatory tactics used by Perón and the fact that they do not feel he can be counted on to follow any consistent or reasonable policy.

~~X~~ "La Semana Financiera", a weekly publication edited by Dr. ENRIQUE ~~X~~ GIL, publishes nearly every week an article attacking Perón. In the issue of August 4, 1945, Dr. GIL pointed out in an editorial that no one was opposed to a real program of social justice, nor even to the projects of Colonel Perón and his Secretariat, but what they really objected to was Colonel Perón's remaining in the government, where he had constituted a serious factor of perturbation.

#### The Professionals

Criticism has been just as bitter among the professional men of Argentina. This class, which includes doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, etc., is extremely large and has provoked the comment in the past that the gravest problem of Argentina is its professional proletariat. Because they are so numerous, many of them are able to earn only the most modest living. Perón devoted special efforts to this class through the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare, where he established the so-called direct professional assistance. Nevertheless, he has failed to win the sympathy of the vast majority of them and can probably count on few more than those who have succeeded in getting government jobs or who have hopes of getting them should Perón be elected. The reason for this is that the professionals have been the backbone of the political parties in Argentina and have almost considered politics as their exclusive field. They have, therefore, resented the military government and Colonel Perón. Moreover, in case of an election, their votes would be decided largely by the political parties to which they already belong.

The most severe criticisms of the government and its actions have come from the lawyers. The Colegios de Abogados (Bar Associations) have, ever since the Revolution, criticized numerous steps of the government which they

*Edelman's J.*

considered as contrary to the Argentine constitution and laws. Such acts of the government as the peremptory closing of newspapers, arrests without warrant, and detentions for indefinite periods of time naturally arouse the opposition of the lawyers. A very recent measure of the government which created special judges for cases involving labor disputes has been most severely condemned inasmuch as the lawyers do not consider that the government has a right to create courts by decree. In fact, some time ago when the government attempted to create an ordinary court by decree in a district where it was thought there were too few courts, the Supreme Court of the nation ruled that the government did not have the right to create courts. Nevertheless, when it was decided recently to set up the special labor courts, the government ignored the Supreme Court's ruling and the new judges were sworn in by President FARRELL himself, rather than by the Supreme Court, which is customary. As a result, the Buenos Aires Bar Association, on August 4, 1945, expelled from its membership those lawyers who had accepted the appointments as judges of the labor courts.

Other professional groups have not been so critical but have voiced a demand for the return to normalcy. They include the Argentine Medical Association, the Argentine Writers' Society, the Argentine Union of Engineers' Associations, and numerous other local associations of teachers, lawyers, doctors, musicians, and engineers.

One of the first groups to return to normalcy was the national university system. Elections were allowed in the universities some months ago and in every case the candidates of the "reform" ticket won out, that is, the candidates who opposed the interventors which had been appointed by the government. As a result, most of the instructors of nationalist or reactionary tendencies were eliminated from the faculties, foremost among whom being Dr. JORDAN BRUNO GENTIA, Dr. RICARDO DE LA LABOUGLE, and Dr. DIEGO LUIS MOLINARI. Moreover, on July 30th, the Rectors of the National Universities, meeting in Buenos Aires, presented to the President a resolution in which they pointed out the necessity of an atmosphere of freedom and legality in the universities and in the country as a whole. They also expressed their approval of the President's announcement that he would convoke elections before the end of the year, that the armed forces would not influence the elections, and that the government was not attempting to impose its own successor.

#### The Clergy

Although the clergy maintains a discreet aloofness



from political matters, especially since the failure of a number of its members who acted in the government of General PEDRO P. RAMIREZ, it is logical to suppose that they are not sympathetic toward Colonel Perón. It will be remembered that in the early days of the revolutionary government, Father ROBERTO WILKINSON (DIRUBE) was one of the closest advisers of President RAMIREZ and his loss of influence with the government was attributed to Colonel Perón. Similarly, Perón was considered responsible for the removal of Father Juan R. SEPICH, reactionary rector of the Colegio Buenos Aires, and for the resignations of two laymen who had the confidence of the clergy, Dr. ROMULO ECHEVERRY BONEO, former Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, and Dr. José Ignacio OLMEDO, former President of the National Council of Education.

### The Press

At the present time Perón does not have the support of any of the most important organs of the Argentine press. In Buenos Aires, the important morning newspapers "La Prensa", "La Nación", and "El Mundo", have all been critical of the military government and of the policies of Colonel Perón. For the most part these papers are considered to be financially sound, and there is little possibility that they could be brought to support Perón at any future date. The afternoon dailies in Buenos Aires are not in a similar position. Although none of them at present support Perón, there is in each case the possibility that they might be converted to his cause. "Noticias Graficas", despite the fact that its director, JOSE AGUSTI, was arrested by the military government and detained for some time and despite the fact that it has adopted a position opposed to Perón, is capable of being used for covert propaganda purposes, provided Perón were willing to pay enough. Nevertheless, the paper is normally an organ of the "intransigent" Radicals and anti-Perón.

"La Razon", the most serious of the three afternoon dailies, is normally a Conservative paper and follows a central position with respect to Argentine politics. However, its financial status is not considered to be too good and according to Source H, it is indebted to the government banks, by reason of which pressure could be brought to bear on this paper.

"Critica", the most popular of the three evening papers, is directed by the former national deputy, Raul Damonte Taborda, a personal friend of Perón and one of the

persons within the Radical Party who is disposed to cooperate with Perón in bringing that party into power. This paper has already carried one or two editorials discreetly favoring party collaboration with Perón. However, it has not yet openly adopted a policy of support for the official candidate.

Several other dailies of precarious financial position, such as ~~"Hoy"~~, ~~"El Nacional"~~, ~~"El Diario"~~, have so far espoused a civilian solution without Perón, but could probably be brought into line with money.

Among the weekly papers in Buenos Aires the prominent ones are ~~"La Vanguardia"~~, Socialist organ, ~~"Anti-Nazi"~~, and ~~"El Patriota"~~, which is Communist or pro-Communist. All of these papers are violently anti-government and anti-Perón. It is not considered that any of them could be converted to his support.

In the interior of the country the most important papers have shown themselves to be against Perón and in favor of any democratic candidate of the opposition. These papers include ~~"El Dia"~~ of La Plata, ~~"La Capital de Rosario"~~, ~~"La Gaceta"~~ of Tucumán, which is distributed throughout the northern provinces of the country, and ~~"El Diario"~~ of Paraná (Province of Entrerios).

Smaller and less important papers whose financial position is not so sound might be brought to support Perón in the same manner as those in the same position in Buenos Aires.

A pro-Perón newspaper was established about two months ago in Mendoza. It is called ~~"Ultimas Noticias"~~ and is edited by Sr. ~~ROCHA DEMARIA~~, who was formerly Director of the Government Press Office. Perón organs in Buenos Aires have also put out a number of small papers in favor of him, but because of their obvious propaganda purposes they are not considered important in molding public opinion. Among these are ~~"De Frente"~~ and ~~"Retaguardia"~~, both weeklies, whose primary purpose seems to be to combat the Socialist weekly ~~"La Vanguardia"~~. Another such paper is ~~"La Epoca"~~ whose publication is irregular. Two new papers are ~~"La Batalla"~~, directed by JOAQUIN ~~COCA~~ and JOSE ~~PALEIRO~~, and ~~"SOBRE LA MARCHA"~~, directed by BLANCA ~~LUZ BRUM~~. Perón also has the some time support of the Nationalist Labor ~~"La Fronda"~~.

#### The Nationalists

Colonel Perón is considered the No. 1 enemy of the Nationalists in Argentina. He has from time to time had

their support, but he has so often betrayed them that there is little possibility that they will ever again come out in support of him. In the first place, he is considered responsible for the recent change in the international position of the country, for the breaking of relations with the Axis, and ultimately the declaration of war. In the second place, the leftist policy he has adopted in internal matters is directly contrary to Nationalist aspirations. It will be remembered that Argentine nationalism came into being about 1930 to oppose the leftist policies of HIPOLITO IRIGOYEN. Perón's effort to swing the Radical Party to his support and to become a sort of second IRIGOYEN makes him the natural opponent of the Nationalists. He has also been responsible for the elimination from the government of a number of Nationalists who formerly held important positions, such as General ORLANDO PELUFFO, Dr. ALBERTO BALDRICH, Dr. BONIFACIO DEL CARRIL and Dr. RICARDO FONTEZCURRA.

Confronted by a choice between Colonel Perón and a civilian candidate of democratic tendencies, it is probable that the Nationalists would return to their traditional position of abstaining from voting or voting in blank, which is the policy they have followed ever since 1930.

#### Labor

Among the laboring masses Perón has worked hardest in favor of gaining popular support. Within a few months after the 1943 revolution there was created by the government the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare, and Colonel Perón took office as the first secretary of this entity. It is the opinion of most observers that even at that time he was looking forward to the possibility of being a candidate for president in the future and that he secured this post for himself as the one in which he could come into contact with the greatest number of Argentine voters and win a following for himself.

In this sense he has tried to emulate the former Radical President, HIPOLITO IRIGOYEN, the most popular political figure in Argentine history, but he has even surpassed Irigoyen in the rapidity with which he tried to win labor to his support, as well as in the audacity of his measures. However, he has encountered suspicions which Irigoyen was never faced with, probably due to the fact that he is a military man and for that reason is not trusted by the laborers. Also, whereas Irigoyen never requested anything in return for the benefits which he achieved for the laboring classes, Perón has endeavored to control their labor unions and has on several occasions called for their

support in staging demonstrations designed to show his popularity.

From his position as Secretary of Labor and Welfare, he has succeeded in gaining control of several labor unions and syndicates. This has been fairly easy to accomplish simply by means of bringing about the arrest or exile of existing labor leaders who opposed him and sponsoring the rise of new leaders whom he could count on. A good example of the methods he used is in the situation of the municipal employees. A number of them were invited to call on the Secretary of Labor and Welfare, which they did, but found that none of their leaders were present in the delegation. The Labor Department official who received them commented upon the fact that none of their leaders should come to represent them and suggested that the union should be intervened and new leaders appointed. On the following day, the story as given to the newspapers was that the workers had called on the Secretariat and requested that their union be intervened.

It is difficult to estimate the number of workers who actually support Colonel Perón. In many cases he has simply secured the support of the union leaders, but this does not necessarily mean that the union as a whole approves of his policies. Also in a number of cases he has divided unions into two organizations; where his followers were unable to take over the leadership of the union, they simply broke away from it and formed a new organization. As a result, the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare would take official recognition of the new organization and declare the other illegal, oftentimes sending the police to close the union's headquarters and arrest its leaders. Meanwhile, by granting benefits to the new union, they would bring a number of workers to support it.

Among the unions which Perón has been able to organize or win over to his support are the following:

~~X~~ Confederación General de Trabajo--This is the general labor central organization comparable to the A.F. of L. or the C.I.O. in the United States. Some time ago it was split into two entities, one following the Socialists and the other following the Communists. Perón gained control of the organization by the arrest and exile of its leaders, prominent among whom was FRANCISCO PEREZ LEIROS, who is now in exile in Montevideo. The new leaders, who support Perón, are ANGEL BORLENGHI, head of the Commission for Syndical Unity, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, JUAN PARDO, MANUEL PICHIEL, MANUEL MATEO, and JOSÉ MARIA ARGANA.

~~X~~ Union Obrera Metalurgica--The director of this organization is ANTONIO ANDREOTTI. It is a member union of the

Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT).

~~X~~ Sindicato de Obreros Sastres y Costureros--This organization is directed by Señora ELVIRADE ~~X~~ LENTIS, and also adheres to the CGT.

~~X~~ Asociación del Personal de Hospitales y Sanatorios--This group is directed by INOCENCIO E. ~~X~~ DI GIOVANNI.

~~X~~ Sindicato Obrero Gastronomico, Comision Provisional--This was formed by dividing the Union of Food Handlers into two organizations; the one named above supports Colonel Perón, while the other, known as ~~X~~ Comision Administrativa del Sindicato Obrero de Alimentación, is against Perón.

~~X~~ Empleados de Seguros, Sociedades de Capitulaciones y Ahorros is also in favor of Colonel Perón.

~~X~~ Union de Obreros de la Industria Maderera, whose secretary is EDUARDO ~~X~~ SOLJO, is collaborating with Perón.

~~X~~ Confederación Federal de Empleados y Obreros del Comercio is one of the most important unions supporting Perón and is directed by ANGEL BORLENGHI.

~~X~~ Union de Obreros Municipales is now supporting Perón, after having finally eliminated its former leader, FRANCISCO PEREZ LEIROS, who is in exile.

~~X~~ Union Ferroviaria is headed by TELMO ~~X~~ LUNA.

Other active collaborators of Colonel Perón in propaganda work among the laborers are José ~~X~~ Sanchez ~~X~~ Ducas, Secretary General of the Paper Workers' Union, JOSE MARIA ~~X~~ GARCIA, of the Union Obrera Metalurgica, MARCELINO ~~X~~ BARRO, Secretary of the Union de Obreros en Madera, and MANUEL ~~X~~ RAUD ~~X~~ PEDRERA, a leader in the Glass Workers' Union.

It should be pointed out, however, that several instances have come to light where these collaborators of Perón were renounced by members of their own unions. For example, the attitude of BORLENGHI has been objected to by a number of local unions of commercial employees, especially by the ~~X~~ Asociación de Empleados y Obreros Libres del Comercio of Tucumán, whose President is CARLOS ~~X~~ BLANCHE. Similar unions in Cordoba have protested against BORLENGHI's attitude. Moreover, "La Vanguardia", in its issue of July 17th, carried statements of the members of the Railroad Union in Entrerios, Santa Fé, and Cordoba protesting against the collaborationist attitude of the union's national committee.



On July 31st, "La Prensa" carried a declaration signed by over 100 members of the Union Ferroviaria (Railway Union), protesting against the collaboration with the government.

Some of the most outspoken unions in opposition to Colonel Perón are the following:

~~X~~ Comando Obrero Unico--This is a union composed of the leaders of different labor groups hostile to the policy of the government. It is a sort of small "popular front" whose efforts are directed towards uniting the workers against the policies of Perón. On August 2, 1945 "La Prensa" reported that this organization had directed a manifesto to the working class and to all democratic Argentines demanding a union of democratic forces to regain constitutional normalcy and stating that the working class was not disposed to serve as a front for personal ambitions and dictatorial purposes.

~~X~~ Union Obrera Local--This was also organized a short time ago to combat the policies of the Secretariat of Labor. Among its member unions are the following:

Sindicato Obrero Gastronomico  
Sociedad de Choferes, Camioneros, y Afines  
Union Obrera de Curtidores  
Asociación de Musicos Argentinos  
Union Argentina de Bebida  
Agrupacion Obrera de Transporte Automotor  
Sindicato Obrero de Pintores  
Sindicato de Resistencia de Obreros de Sombreros  
Sindicato de Obreros Pasteleros  
Sindicato de Colocadores de Mosaicos

~~X~~ Federación Obrera Nacional de Construcción--This is one of the invincible workers' organizations, due largely to the predominant Communist influence. The Chief, PEDRO CHIARANTI, is at present in Montevideo. Other important leaders are ANGEL ORTELLO, MIGUEL BORJAS, and FIORI ORTELLO. This organization had a meeting in Luna Park in Buenos Aires on August 3rd, at which time RUBENS ISCARO spoke and exhorted the members of all labor syndicates to comply with their "duty of the hour" of creating an authentic labor center free from collaborationists.

~~X~~ Comisión Administrativa del Sindicato Unico de Obreros En Madera, headed by ANTONIO BETTICHERI, is also against Perón.

~~X~~ Sindicato Obrero de la Industria Metalurgica--This



organization claims to have about 70,000 members, but it has been divided by the Secretariat of Labor, which created the pro-Perón organization called ~~Union Metalurgica Argentina~~. On August 5, 1945, ~~la Prensa~~ reported that a delegation of this syndicate had visited the offices of this newspaper on the preceeding day to deliver a communiqué expressing their desire that the workers be granted the freedom guaranteed them by the Constitution. They also stated that during the preceeding month six of the Syndicate's labor leaders were detained and lodged in Villa Devoto.

~~Sindicato Unico de Madera~~--This union has had many of its leaders arrested, the most prominent among whom is LUIS V. ~~SOMMI~~, who is now in exile in Montevideo. After these arrests, the Secretariat of Labor divided the union and created one favorable to itself under the name of "Union Obrera Maderera." Despite this, Source I reports that the membership of the syndicate has risen from 1,500 to 5,000.

~~Federación Obrera de la Industria de Carne~~--The outstanding leader of this union is JOSE ~~PETER~~, who has been many times arrested by the Argentine police and who is now in Montevideo in exile. The union opposes Perón.

As will be seen from the above, there are so many cases of divided unions that it is most difficult to estimate just what strength Colonel Perón has among the laborers. It is evident that he is afraid of the influence of the old time labor leaders, many of whom still remain under arrest or in exile. In the latter part of July a number of these leaders embarked at Montevideo to return to Argentina. On arrival, however, they were informed that they must return to Uruguay or they would be placed under arrest. These leaders included ~~RICARDO CANTONI~~ of the Shoe Workers' Union, ~~PEDRO TADICOLI~~ of the Construction Syndicate, LUIS V. ~~SOMMI~~ of the Wood Workers' Syndicate, ~~FELIPE DESRODNIK~~, ~~RICARDO HAMOL~~, and ~~ADOLFO ROIG~~.

It should also be mentioned that on July 12th, when the workers were called upon to stage a demonstration against the so-called Fuerzas Vivas and to demonstrate Perón's popularity, less than 50,000 of them were present, despite the fact that the demonstration had been given the widest publicity, plus the fact that some delegates from outside Buenos Aires had their transportation paid and government employees were required to attend. Another interesting event indicative of the workers' attitude was the visit paid to United States Ambassador Spruille Braden by a number of workers recently to express their friendliness towards him and the country he represented, after the Ambassador had been attacked by a scurrilous propaganda

campaign which most Argentines believe was inspired by Colonel Perón. Among the workers who called on the Ambassador were representatives of the following organizations: Federación Obrera Nacional de Construcciones, Sindicato Obrero de la Construcción de la Capital Federal, Federación Gráfica Bonaerense, Federación Argentina de Trabajadores de Imprenta, Unión Obrera Local de la Capital Federal, Unión Obrera de Curtidores, Sindicato de Obreros Pintores, Sindicato de Obreros de la Industria Metalúrgica, Sindicato Obrero de la Alimentación, Unión Obrera Textil, Sindicato Obrero de la Industria del Vestido, Sindicato de Choferes de Camiones y Anexos.

It is indubitable that Perón has won the sympathy of some laborers because of the benefits conferred upon them. There are a number of laborers, however, who, although willing to take advantage of any benefits Perón can give them, would not be willing to respond by voting for him should he be a candidate for office. There is also the fact to be considered that labor union members have in the past belonged to either the Socialist, Radical, or Communist Parties, and it is doubtful that they would support Perón unless he secured the nomination of one of these parties. Still another fact of importance is that a large proportion of the labor union members are unable to vote because they are immigrants and have not yet been naturalized in this country.

## POLITICAL PARTIES

### Partido Demócrata Nacional

This party, which represents the conservative thought in Argentine politics, had been in office prior to the Revolution of 1943 and bore the brunt of many declarations and actions of the revolutionary government. It is the second largest national party in the country, but in recent years has only been able to perpetuate itself in power by means of electoral frauds. For this reason, Perón did not seek the support of this party and has, in fact, attacked it in many speeches. His policy of wooing the laboring classes and seeking support from leftist groups has aroused the opposition of conservative elements and there is no doubt that they will constitute a strong force in opposition to his candidacy. Two of the prominent leaders of the party are Dr. RODOLFO MORENO and Dr. ANTONIO SANTAMARINA. Moreno is one of the political exiles in Montevideo and one of the bitterest critics of the military government. Santamarina was arrested in December, 1944 on a charge of conspiring with Communists for the theft of an airplane to distribute subversive literature over the city on the day of the Reservists. He was detained for a number of months and is severely critical of Perón, although it has been reported by Source I that he would be capable of reaching an agreement with some other military man,

for instance, General Farrell.

### ~~X~~ Socialist Party

This party, which has its principal strength in the Federal Capital and in some cities of the interior, has become the Enemy No. 1 of Colonel Perón. Its newspaper "La Vanguardia", has been most critical of him and has prompted his supporters to publish its competing newspapers, "Retaguardia" and "De Frente". According to Source D, Perón is extremely hostile towards the Socialists, having reached such a point that he was willing to recognize the existence of the Communist Party, which has always been a bitter enemy of the Socialists. This, he believed, would offer the voters of leftist tendencies an escape valve, and he has hopes of gaining some of the Communist support for himself. Outstanding leaders of this party are Drs. ALFREDO PALAGIOS and NICOLAS REPETTO, both in exile in Montevideo, and Dr. AMERICO GHIOLDI, the editor of "La Vanguardia." On July 2, 1945, the party issued a manifesto edited in the strongest terms of criticism of the military government and of all its components. It is undoubtedly an electoral force which would oppose Colonel Perón.

### ~~X~~ Union Civica Radical

The Union Civica Radical, commonly known as the Radical Party, is, without dispute, the majority party in Argentina. For this reason, and because the history of the party is such that its aims are similar to those claimed by Perón in his work as Secretary of Labor, he has endeavored to secure the support of the Radical Party for his candidacy. In April, 1945, the Acting Minister of the Interior, Admiral TEISAIRE, had an interview with Dr. JUAN I. COOKE. Admiral TEISAIRE is a very close friend of Perón and was apparently selected by Perón to manage the campaign to get himself proclaimed candidate and ultimately to be elected as president. Dr. Cooke is a prominent leader in the Radical Party and was formerly a member of the Chamber of Deputies from Buenos Aires Province. At the interview which took place on April 10th, the Minister suggested the possibility of a solution to the abnormal political situation by means of naming a military man to run for President on the Radical Party ticket. He stated that this would be a quick and effective means of returning to the normal constitutional system, and at the same time would provide the armed forces with the guaranty which they require that the revolution would not have been in vain and that the succeeding government would continue with the program brought in by the revolutionary regime. When asked if the military candidate would have to be Colonel Perón, the Minister replied that that would not be necessary, but he pointed out that the good work which Colonel Perón has done in rectifying the international position of Argentina and in

benefiting the laboring classes should be remembered. He asked Dr. COOKE to consult among the Radical leaders in order to ascertain whether such a solution could be arrived at.

The above account of this interview was furnished by reliable Source D, who was advised that Dr. COOKE proceeded to interview a number of the most prominent Radical Party leaders. Among the persons interviewed was Dr. ELPIDIO GONZALEZ, former Vice President of the Republic, former minister and former legislator, who indicated he would be willing to collaborate in order to bring the Radical Party into power once again; Dr. ENRIQUE MOSCA, a Radical leader in the Province of Santa Fé and one of the outstanding men in the party, who expressed himself as opposed to the candidacy of Colonel Perón, but did not indicate an attitude of absolute intransigence; Dr. JOSÉ P. TAMBORINI, former senator from the Federal Capital and considered within the party as a possible candidate for the presidency, who expressed himself as being in accord on some points in order to reach a reconciliation, although he did not definitely approve of the candidacy of Colonel Perón. Another leader talked to was Engineer ERNESTO C. BOATTI, also a party leader from the Province of Buenos Aires, who is opposed to any kind of an agreement with Colonel Perón, but who has not expressed himself openly to that effect because of certain business interests which he cannot prejudice by open opposition to Colonel Perón. However, Boatti did speak with MOSCA, TAMBORINI, and EDUARDO LAURENCENA, who afterwards suggested to Cooke that he delay his activities on behalf of Colonel Perón until party members could speak further among themselves.

Source D advised that the following party leaders, however, were in favor of an agreement with Colonel Perón: RAUL DAMONTE TABORDA, former national deputy and editor of "Crítica"; Dr. MARIO GUIDO, who was Vice-Governor elect of the Province of Buenos Aires at the time the elections were annulled by the revolutionary government of General URIBURU; Dr. OBDULIO SIRI, former national deputy and former Minister of Government in the Province of Buenos Aires; Dr. AMADEO SABATINI, former Governor of the Province of Córdoba and a man of great importance within the party; Sr. JULIAN SANCERNI GIMENEZ, former national deputy from the Federal Capital and former president of the national committee of the UCR. On the other hand he named as being absolutely opposed to any agreement with Perón the former deputies SILVANO SANTANDER and AGUSTIN RODRIGUEZ ARAYA, the former representing the Province of Entreríos and the latter representing the Province of Santa Fé. They are both in exile in Montevideo and both favor a coalition of parties opposed to Colonel Perón. Likewise, among those opposed to collaboration may be listed HONORIO PUEYREDON, former candidate for governor of the Province of Buenos Aires and former minister under IRIGOYEN, and GABRIEL ODDONE, President of the UCR.

On June 30, 1945, a meeting of Radical Party leaders was held in the town of Nueve de Julio in the Province of Buenos Aires. At that time it was expected that Perón would have his friends on hand to further his plans for collaboration with the party. However, Source H, who attended the meeting, reported that there was no evidence whatsoever of pro-Perón sympathies at the meeting. This source stated that on the special train which went from Buenos Aires to Nueve de Julio there were manifestations of unwillingness to collaborate. When one of the delegates on the train shouted "Abajo el Coronel Perón" (Down with Colonel Perón), there was a loud response of many voices shouting "Abajo". The only sight of Perón's sympathizers was the group of "Revisionist" Radicals from the Province of Buenos Aires who met the train and attempted to create confusion by shouting "Viva Sabattini" (Amadeo Sabattini, a Perón collaborator). However, inasmuch as it was raining at the time and there was no march from the station to the Plaza Hotel, where the meeting was to be held, these manifestations were practically without importance. Once the banquet had begun in the Plaza Hotel, there was no pro-government manifestation of any kind. The only hint that the party might collaborate with any outside group was in the speech of Dr. ENRIQUE MOSCA, and this provoked whistling and cries of "Radicales solos" (Radicals only). The general trend of speeches was for a return to constitutional government, respect for civil rights, release of political prisoners, and the derogation of the Political Parties' Statute, which Dr. ATANASIO EGUIGUREN termed "The statute for not returning to normalcy".

There were several such humorous slaps at the government, all of which brought forth laughter and applause. Some speakers spoke outright against the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare and against Colonel Perón, and they, too, were roundly applauded. Dr. EDUARDO TEISAIRE, Radical leader from the Province of Santa Fe and brother of the Acting Minister of Interior, said that "there is nothing Argentine in the Casa Rosada." Dr. ALBARRACIN GODOY declared that the Radical Party was the entity which should take up the fight against the Secretariat of Labor. The delegates seemed unanimous in favoring an attitude of complete intransigence and seemed aware of the tremendous power of a unified Radical Party. The outstanding figure seemed to be Dr. José P. Tamborini, who received a prolonged ovation and whose name was shouted by many of the delegates as the future Radical President.

In view of the pronounced spirit against collaboration evident at this meeting, it is clear that the Radical Party as a whole will never support the candidacy of Perón. Even those Radicals who had committed themselves to support Perón have been afraid to make any pronouncements to that effect for fear of prejudicing their own positions within the party. On the day



that the meeting took place, the Radical leaders, Dr. JUAN I. COOKE and ALBERTO REALES, announced that they would not accept the nominations offered them by the government as interventors in the Provinces of Cordoba and San Juan. Nevertheless, Source D reports that these men are still disposed to collaborate with Colonel Perón even if it results in a split in the Radical Party. Pledged to this end are the leaders JULIAN SANCERNI, GIMENEZ, ABDULIO SIRI, MARIO GUIDO, and AMADEO SABATTINI. Also pledged to support Perón is the faction known as Revisionist Radicals in the Province of Buenos Aires. This is a small faction and has no importance at all outside the Province of Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, the party leaders have sensed the majority spirit of non-collaboration and have on several occasions already expelled from the party those members who accepted positions offered them by the government. The most recent and daring move of that nature was on August 6th, when the party expelled Dr. J. HORTENSIO GUIJANO, who had just been named Minister of Interior. The naming of this man, a long time Radical from the Province of Corrientes, to such an important government post is evidence that Perón intends to run on the Radical ticket even if it requires a division of the party.

#### Other Parties

Aside from these three major parties, there are several small parties which are important only in certain localities of the Republic. Of these the most important is the Partido Demócrata Progresista of Santa Fé. Its leader is Dr. LUCIANO MOLINA, who is exiled in Montevideo and who may possibly be in a position to be an opposition candidate to Colonel Perón in case of a coalition to oppose Perón. At any rate, there is no doubt that the Progressive Democrats will not support Perón.

Another of the smaller parties is that known as the "Radical Blocquista", which is directed by Dr. FEDERICO CANTONI. This party is the majority party in the Province of San Juan, and Source H states that Dr. CANTONI will support Colonel Perón.

Other groups which have always been inclined to support an official candidate are the "Anti-Personalist Radicals", who are important in the Provinces of Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, and Santa Fé.

#### OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS

In discussing the above sectors, mention has been made under each group of those who favor and those who oppose Colonel Perón. There are, however, other groups which have not been mentioned and which have been active in opposition to the government and to Perón. Two of these groups, Patria Libre and Asociación de Mayo, were formed in the hope of



organizing a force capable of overthrowing the military government. The Patria Libre group is under the influence of the Communists and is the most effective of the two, due to the knowledge which the Communists were able to contribute and which has aided the group in its clandestine activities. The other group is predominantly Socialist and was formed mainly because the Socialists refused to enter into any group which was under the dominance of the Communists. Both of these groups have been active in distributing clandestine literature criticizing the government and its activities, but as yet they have accomplished nothing in the way of effective measures to overthrow the government. Patria Libre claims to have some military support and some armed civilians, but it is not believed they constitute a threat to the government, especially since the latter has indicated it is about to convoke elections. Both of these groups are actively connected with the political exiles in Montevideo, most prominent among whom are ALFREDO PALACIOS, LUCIANO MOLINA, and JOSE AGUIRRE CAMERA. All three of these men are well thought of within Argentina and their penetrating criticisms of the government, especially of its financial manipulations, have been widely diffused throughout Argentina. It cannot be said that these forces have not accomplished some good, because they have certainly contributed to keeping alive the attitude of resistance to the government which has appeared recently to have had some effect in persuading it to go out of office.

With respect to the Communists, it should be stated that Perón has expressed his willingness to make an agreement with them and his belief that such could be done. When the Political Parties' Statute was issued on August 1st, it was announced that the Communist Party might organize just as any other party would do and that the police would cease their persecutions of party members. As yet, there has been no indication of any change in Communist feeling against Colonel Perón, however.

With respect to opposition directed towards the government, but not towards Perón, it can be said that there is practically none. As mentioned heretofore, the average Argentine conceives of the government as identical to Colonel Perón and considers him to be the dominant force in the government. The only persons who would fall into this category are perhaps those who oppose the continuance of the military regime, but who favor the candidacy of Perón--notably the pro-Perón members of the Radical Party.

#### Divisions Within the Government

There are no serious differences within the government. As has already been mentioned, the only persons who even slightly oppose Colonel Perón are Dr. ALLEGHINO and General PISTARINI, and they are not so much in direct opposition to him as merely

non-sympathetic toward his policies. There have from time to time been rumors of differences between Perón and Farrell and between Perón and Velazco, but there have never been any substantial indications that such rumors were true.

#### SERIOUS DIFFERENCES AMONG THE OPPOSITION GROUPS

There are really no serious differences among the opposition groups, but there are difficulties which would arise in the consideration of a coalition to oppose the candidacy of Perón. The Socialists and Communists have never been able to get together because of their historical differences, and it is not contemplated that they would enter into an agreement to oppose Perón, although it is surely possible that each of them might oppose him independently. There is also little possibility of a coalition between the Radicals and the Conservatives, because they are traditionally opposition parties and, moreover, the Radical Party considers itself a majority party and without need of any assistance from the Conservatives. Radical leaders are also bitter over the electoral frauds by means of which the Conservatives managed to hold the reins of office from 1930 until the Revolution of 1943. The Radicals have shown themselves indisposed to enter into a coalition with any other force because their majority position does not require it. The principal problem involved in a coalition would be the names put up for president and vice president, and the Radical Party would insist on having its candidates in both these positions on the ballot. It would be possible that the Socialists and Progressive Democrats might agree to support the Radical candidates for president and vice president and have their separate tickets for local offices. The Socialists favor a coalition, inasmuch as they are a limited force, their principal strength being in the Federal Capital. The Progressive Democrats also favor a coalition and might support another party's candidates for president and vice president, inasmuch as their own strength is limited to the Province of Santa Fé. One wing of the Conservative Party, that headed by Dr. ANTONIO SANTAMARINA, also favors a coalition, but because of the frauds it has practiced in the past and the intense public feeling against the party, there is doubt that it could persuade other parties to enter into a coalition with it.

In this connection, much depends upon the success of Perón's efforts to win over more leaders of the Radical Party. If he should succeed in lining up a considerable faction of this party, the UCR might be forced out of its present intransigent attitude.

#### POSSIBILITY OF RETURN TO NORMALCY UNDER PERÓN

A return to normalcy under Colonel Perón would be possible only if he were elected to office through honest elections. Any semblance of fraud would set up such a howl

from the opposition as has been heard ever since the Revolution of June 4, 1943. Such protest would put the armed forces on the defensive as having sponsored the continuance of Colonel Perón in office. The inevitable result would be either the embarrassment of the military forces to such an extent that they would have to oust Perón or severe measures would be taken to hush the critics of Perón, just as has been done during the last two years.

Perón's chances of being elected through honest elections are no good unless he secures the backing of a major party. As already mentioned, he could not secure the backing of the Conservatives or of the Socialists and his efforts to win the Radicals have been fruitless so far. His efforts to this end are continuing, however, and he does have some Radical Party support, as mentioned already in discussing that Party. The naming of Dr. J. HORTENSIO QUIJANO, a Radical from the Province of Corrientes, as Minister of Interior, was undoubtedly designed to procure more Radical support and will probably have that effect, although the National Committee of the Party has expelled Dr. QUIJANO. The net result may be a division within the party into leftist and rightist groups, such as took place at the time when MARCELO ALVEAR broke away from the party to form a rightist group within the party. There have already been some evidences of this trend in that Perón has claimed for himself the banner of the party's greatest leftist leader, HIPOLITO IRIGOYEN. In a banquet held at the Parque Retiro on July 24, 1945, the organizing committee called itself the "authentic soldiers of Irigoyenism" and after the banquet a group of some six hundred people marched to the residence of Colonel Perón, where they requested him to present his candidacy for President.

Also, on July 26, a number of handbills were distributed on the streets of Buenos Aires, calling on the Radicals to celebrate the Revolution of 1890 and to "reaffirm the program of Alem (Leandro Alem), the doctrine of Irigoyen, and the work of Perón." There was also on the reverse side of this handbill a little verse of five stanzas, repeating the names of Alem, Irigoyen, and Perón, with the instructions that these stanzas should be sung to the traditional Radical Party tune.

It is still too early to tell what chances Perón would have of success, even if he secured the backing of a large faction of the Radical Party. For more than seventeen years there have been no honest elections in Argentina. Moreover, the success of Perón would be very much dependent upon the identity and backing of his opposition.

The presidential election is carried out much as it is in the States, by means of an electoral college. Below there is set out a table of the number of electors corresponding to the Federal Capital and to each of the Provinces:

<u>Electoral District</u>	<u>Number of Electors</u>
Federal Capital	68
Province of:	
Buenos Aires	88
Santa Fé	42
Cordoba	34
Entrerios	22
Corrientes	18
Tucumán	18
Santiago del Estero	16
Mendoza	16
San Juan	10
Salta	10
San Luis	10
La Rioja	8
Catamarca	8
JuJuy	8
Total	<u>376</u>

Persons living in the national territories are not allowed to vote.

Source H, who is very well informed with regard to Argentina's political history, has furnished the following comments with regard to the probable results of an election at the present time.

#### Federal Capital

The Federal Capital, or city of Buenos Aires, with sixty-eight electors, has two very strong political forces, the Socialists and the Radicals. History, however, shows that the Capital is almost invariably in opposition to whatever official candidate is running for President. On September 5, 1937, despite the strong Radical groups pledged to the official candidate, Ortiz, plus the support of the National Democratic Party and the intense campaign carried out through official resources, the official candidate was defeated by a vote of 256,607 against 110,225. Also on November 8, 1931, the Progressive Democratic candidate defeated General Justo, the official candidate, by more than 40,000 votes.

#### Province of Buenos Aires

The two great forces in the Province are the Radical and Conservative Parties. The Province has always been the scene of the greatest electoral frauds. There has also been evident in the Province a strong opposition trend to any official candidate. Nevertheless, Colonel Perón has been working on the Province of Buenos Aires for many months, while he kept his man of confidence, Atilio Bramuglia, as the Federal Interventor. Moreover, should he have the backing of OBDULIO SIRI in the

Province, he would have a fairly good chance of winning the eighty-eight electors.

#### Province of Santa Fé

The principal forces in this Province are the UCR, the Progressive Democratic Party, and the Anti-Personalist Radicals. Perón would undoubtedly have the opposition of the Progressive Democrats and would probably be opposed by the UCR, due to the fact that Dr. ENRIQUE MOSCA, a party leader who is opposed to Perón, has great influence in this Province. Perón would probably have the support of the Anti-Personalist Radicals, who generally support official candidates. Nevertheless, he would almost surely lose this Province.

#### Province of Cordoba

The principal forces are the Radical Party and the Conservative Party. Although the Radical leader, Dr. AMADEO SABATINI, has indicated he will support Perón, it is doubtful that he could carry the Province if the Radical Party should be divided, especially in view of the opposition of the Conservative Party, headed by the pro-Allied, progressive, and liberal JOSÉ AGUIRRE CAMARA.

#### Province of Entrerios

The Radical Party is the majority party within the Province, although the Conservative Party also has a very strong following. In view of the opposition of the outstanding provincial Radical Party leader, EDUARDO LAURENCENA, this party would almost surely go to the opposition.

#### Province of Corrientes

The history of this Province shows that it generally supports any official candidate. Moreover, the Radical Party is strong and the fact that the Radical leader, J. HORTENSIO JULIANO, recently named Minister of Interior, comes from that Province would be an even greater factor in favor of Colonel Perón in this Province.

#### Province of Tucumán

There are a number of forces in this Province, the UCR, the "Concurrencistas", Radicals, the Conservatives, and the "Defensa Provincial." Leaders of all of these parties have indicated their opposition to the government and to Colonel Perón. He would almost surely lose this Province against a presidential candidate from the Conservative Party.

#### Santiago del Estero



This Province during recent years has been controlled by the Partido Radical Unificado, whose leaders have enriched themselves by reason of their position and who would undoubtedly support Perón rather than expose themselves to official pressure because of their past negotiations.

#### Province of Mendoza

In the Province of Mendoza the principal forces are the UCR, the Conservatives, and the Radical faction known as "Lencinistas". Perón's success in this Province would depend largely upon his success in lining up the Radical Party faction. He might win the Province with very strong Radical support, but without such support he would have little chance against the strong Conservative Party.

#### Province of San Juan

This Province is controlled by the Radical faction known as the "Blocquistas", whose leader, Dr. FEDERICO CANTONI, has indicated he will support Colonel Perón.

#### Province of San Luis

This has always been a bulwark of the Conservative Party, probably the only district where that Party has an electoral majority. The leader is ARANCIBIA RODRIGUEZ, who would follow the action of the Party as a whole, which is expected to be contrary to Perón.

#### Provinces of Salta, La Rioja, Catamarca, and Jujuy

These Provinces have generally gone to the official candidates, due to the fact that they are largely controlled by such large landholders as ROBUSTIANO PATRON COSTA, whose holdings prevent them from openly opposing any official candidate. With strong Radical Party support, Perón would undoubtedly carry these Provinces, where it is possible to carry out extensive propaganda from government offices. Without strong Radical support, his position would be less certain.

Probably the biggest single deciding factor for or against Perón is the Province of Buenos Aires, with its eighty-eight electors. As already mentioned, Perón has carried on extensive propaganda through the Interventor, Dr. BRAMUGLIA. However, the latter has not won the support which was hoped for in the Province. Shortly after his designation, he dismissed a number of government employees from 110 departments of the Province and endeavored to use these positions as a means of surrounding himself with influential leaders. However, the first group to flock to his support and to claim



the nominations at his disposal was the group known as Revisionist Radicals, headed by Drs. ~~SALVADOR CETRA~~ and ~~ALEJANDRO LELOIR~~. This group responded more to personal interest and individual ambitions than to any Party aims, and this resulted in a loss of prestige of the government of Dr. BRAMUGLIA. As a result, the authentic Radical Party (UCR) has attacked the government and refused to have anything to do with BRAMUGLIA. Moreover, the Interventor failed to give the laborers in the packing plants throughout the Province the benefits which have been promised them and he has consequently lost their support. He has aroused considerable ill feeling because of increased taxes and failure to control the rise in living costs. It is the general opinion in the Province, according to Source I, that BRAMUGLIA has failed to win substantial support there for Ferón. After Dr. QUIJANO became Minister of the Interior, BRAMUGLIA presented his resignation, and it was generally believed that it would be accepted. However, Dr. QUIJANO recently announced that BRAMUGLIA had been confirmed in his position.

## IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES

The following will show the identification of sources mentioned in the report of Special Agent Howard K. Rutherford, dated 8-14-45 at Buenos Aires, Argentina, entitled: "COLONEL JUAN D. PERÓN; Foreign Political Matter:"

~~CONF. INFT.~~

Source C - [redacted]

Source D - [redacted]

Source E - [redacted]

Source F - [redacted]

Source H - [redacted]

Source I - [redacted]

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### Enclosures to Bureau

1. Photograph of crowd gathered at Florida and Diagonal Norte on occasion of labor celebration against the "Fuerzas Vivas" on July 12, 1945.
2. Photograph of crowd in front of Secretariat of Labor and Welfare during Perón's speech from the balcony on July 12th.
3. Electoral ~~propaganda~~ *Photography* on Perón, including one copy of a photograph of ~~Perón~~ *Perón*; one copy of a booklet entitled "Una Vivienda para Cada Familia"; one copy of a booklet bearing the legend "1 de Mayo con los Trabajadores Argentinos"; one handbill headed "Radicales" and bearing on the reverse side five stanzas of a song to be sung to the tune of the Radical Party song; one copy of a handbill containing the picture of a "Criollo" looking at Colonel Perón's photograph; one copy of a handbill containing the same picture, and above it the words "Colonel Perón".

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CASE: FOREIGN POLITICAL  
MATTER

S.A.: HOWARD K. RUTHERFORD

DATE : AUGUST 14, 1945

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CORONEL JUAN PERON

VICE-PRESIDENTE DE LA NACION  
MINISTRO DE GUERRA Y SECRETARIO DE TRABAJO Y PREVISION

7, 1  
LA REVOLUCION terminó con una época ne-  
fasta para el país y desea: **en lo político**, la  
aplicación pura y simple de las disposiciones de  
su Carta Fundamental; **en lo económico**, un ré-  
gimen de libertad constitucional que concluye,  
como se sabe, donde empieza la libertad de los  
demás, y que exige el control del Estado; y **en  
lo social**, la creación del Derecho del Trabajo  
que permita al ser humano "por el hecho de  
nacer, el derecho de vivir con dignidad".

Aspira, en suma, al restablecimiento de la  
aplicación clara y leal de la Ley. Por eso, el  
ordenamiento jurídico que se busca rápidamente  
en el juego normal de sus instituciones, o lo que  
es lo mismo, la normalidad constitucional, no  
importará jamás volver al engaño de las masas,  
porque el fundamento del Estado es la felicidad  
del conjunto, vale decir, la realización integral  
de la Justicia.

64-2720-24  
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PERON

"LABRIEGO Y OBRERO,  
VERDADEROS ARTIFICES DE LA  
RIQUEZA DE LOS PUEBLOS,  
REIVINDICARAN SUS DERECHOS  
AL AMPARO DEL ESTADO QUE  
PROPUGNA UNA JUSTICIA  
SUPERIOR A LAS DEMAS JUSTI-  
CIAS DE LA TIERRA".

PERON



1<sup>o</sup>  
DE MAYO

CON LOS TRABAJADORES ARGENTINOS

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**"FESTEJEN** ustedes este día, como una fecha íntima, convencidos de que así como las naciones deben tener sus días dedicados a la recordación de los grandes hombres de la historia, también debe haber una fecha destinada a honrar el trabajo, que es lo que da fundamento y grandeza a todos los pueblos de la tierra".

**FARREL**

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**"El** Gobierno vela por el bien del país. Esta es su principal preocupación y lo que anima todos sus actos. Los argentinos útiles deben estar tranquilos, trabajar y producir".

**PERON**

64-29420-24




UNA VIVIENDA PARA CADA FAMILIA  
CADA FAMILIA EN SU VIVIENDA  
PERON



MEJORAR LA VIVIENDA POPULAR ES  
LUCHAR POR EL PRESENTE Y EL FUTURO  
DE LOS TRABAJADORES ARGENTINOS

BUENOS AIRES, 1945







# **RADICALES:**

---

**La U. C. R.** SE ENCUENTRA EN ESTADO DE ASAMBLEA; EN CONSECUENCIA CADA UNO DE NOSOTROS ES INTERPRETE DE LA CAUSA.

**N**O HABIENDOSE CONCRETADO NINGUNA CONFERENCIA PARTIDARIA EN ESTA CAPITAL PARA HONRAR A LOS MARTIRES CAIDOS EN LA

## **REVOLUCION DEL 90**

ESTALLIDO POPULAR CONTRA LA OLIGARQUIA DEBEMOS OFRENDARLES NUESTRO SENTIDO HOMENAJE EN EL SANTUARIO DE CADA HOGAR RADICAL, EL

**26 DE JULIO**

DIA DE SU 55º ANIVERSARIO



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**REAFIRMAMOS EL IDEARIO DE ALEM,  
LA DOCTRINA DE IRIGOYEN Y  
LA OBRA DE PERON, SIEMPRE**

**CONTRA LA OLIGARQUIA**

---

CON RENOVADO FERVOR RADICAL, ANIMEMOS LAS PRO-  
XIMAS ASAMBLEAS PARTIDARIAS ENTONANDO CON  
NUESTRA TRADICIONAL MELODIA ESTAS ESTROFAS:

I

Adelante radicales  
adelante sin cesar  
viva Hipólito Irigoyen  
y el partido Radical.

II

El recuerdo de Irigoyen  
y la obra de Perón  
nos indican el camino  
de la rei-vin-di-ca-ción.

III

La doctrina de Irigoyen  
Practicada por Perón  
Aseguran la justicia  
Para toda la Nación.

IV

Fué de Alem y de Irigoyen  
su profunda convicción  
ni tan ricos ni tan pobres  
que es el lema de Perón.

V

Que se rompa y no se doble  
Fué de Alem la gran lección  
Dando ejemplo de civismo  
Repudiando a la reacción.



**POR LA CAUSA -- CONTRA EL REGIMEN**



# Coronel PERON



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## ¡Muchas Gracias!

***Trabajador Argentino:***

**Lo esperamos el JUEVES 12, a las  
18 horas, en la esquina de Florida  
y Diagonal Roque Sáenz Peña.**

---

**Comité de Asociaciones y Sindicatos Libres**

Office of the Legal Attache  
Buenos Aires, Argentina  
September 21, 1945

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289 656

Director, FBI

BY SP5 C. L. O. M. S.

Re: COLONEL JUAN D. PERÓN  
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTER

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to my letter dated April 2, 1945 in the above captioned matter. In that letter you were advised that one NAGEL CUSTODIO FIGUEROA had written a book entitled "La Verdadera Intencion de Perón" and that 50,000 copies of this book had been printed for release at the time PERON initiates his campaign for the Presidency.

Confidential Informant [ ] has obtained a copy of the above mentioned book, the correct title of which is "La Verdadera Intencion del Coronel Juan D. Peron." [ ]

b7D

As only one copy of this book was obtained and it has been furnished to the Ambassador because of his keen interest in the possibility of PERON'S electoral campaign for the presidency, no copy is available for the Bureau. However, a review of the book was made by [ ] and two copies of this review are being enclosed herewith.

Very truly yours,

*James P. Joice, Jr.*  
James P. Joice, Jr.  
Legal Attache

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(Enclosures - 2)

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&

53 OCT 11 1945

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CAS

THE REAL INTENTIONS OF COLONEL JUAN D. PERON - 1944 EDITORIAL VERDAD,  
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

I. PREFACE

The fact that due to the Revolution of June 4, 1943, a large number of people were deposed politically and economically, has bred discontent.

It is felt up to the people to judge if what has been done is not for the public welfare.

Attempts have been made at home and abroad to create the impression that the revolution was engendered by politically ambitious people.

The honor of the Argentine Army is put in contra-position with the bastard passions of the avaricious interests.

The anachronistic system in the hands of political chieftains lent itself to the insincere desires of those who had achieved power.

There were fraudulent elections, long congressional debates which were sterile, a youth which was asleep and contented, and strange extremist doctrines were taught in the classrooms.

Government was by old men, whose honor and dignity was modified continuously in vicious circles, protecting criminals, avoiding sanctions, and destroying administrative honor.

Businessmen became rich at the cost of the poor.

All political parties--right and left--removed good men and by fraud placed men who were only interested in their personal gain.

The local rich did nothing to create industries but instead allowed foreign capital to absorb with excellent dividends the wealth of the nation, because of their inability to create or foment industries.

Social justice was never a preoccupation of the governing classes.

Even the men of the soil in Tucuman and Salta were renegades.

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**Corruption was everywhere.**

**Under these conditions the army could not remain passive.**

**Triumphant the revolution, its men work not only to abolish the vicious systems but to bring equity to all phases of civic life.**

## **II. PROCLAMATION OF JUNE 4TH TO THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA.**

**This is the already famous proclamation of the armed forces containing a statement that they had perceived the corruption in the government and determined to stamp it out; that they were behind Argentine institutions and laws but against the men who had become delinquent in the application. It expressed a hope for the unity of the Argentine people, a pledge to fight for the sovereignty of the people and to fulfill the country's international obligations, and a "declaration of honor": to work unceasingly in defense of honor, the common welfare, liberty, the rights and interests of the Argentine people.**

## **III. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATION AND COLONEL JUAN D. PERON.**

**This chapter is devoted to a more mention of the concept of the armed forces, who, having heard the cry of the people, left their barracks and marched to overthrow the oppressors. This is followed by a description of the personality of Colonel Peron extolling his virtues. His character is described as "an energetic will at the service of firm convictions". It is said that PERON has demonstrated that he is not dominated by passions, but that all his acts are the result of courageous and calm deliberation as becomes one certain of the truth of his convictions; that he has embraced the cause of the weak. Unafraid and unruffled by rumors he seeks with renewed vigor the social formulas which his mentality has defined and his work consecrates.**

## **IV. TWO CYCLES IN THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE.**

**National Organization (Unity) was the aim of the Argentines until 1862.**

**Social Justice: aim of the men of the Revolution of June 4.**

**In this chapter it is pointed out that the matter before the "Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision" is not a modern creation with new principles but is an old question and contains the study of legislation**

of all countries that have considered the question.

The attempt is made to adjust with justice and harmony the factors of production to thus diminish strikes in favor of conciliations, judging each case with reason. It is emphasized that Colonel Peron is the leader of this movement.

#### V. SOCIAL JUSTICE.

This chapter begins with a statement of Colonel Peron concerning the need for social justice: "Our disquiet is social, not political; motivated by a sense of equity, not by personal ambitions or hates".

The writer then gives the purpose of his book, saying that in pointing out the existence of a feudal campaign to defame Colonel Peron, he does not attempt an apology for him but does wish to point out the necessity for a better understanding of his work, founded in real human interest, which will have to be continued by those who govern in the future.

It is then stated that it has been possible to gain the confidence of the majority of the labor unions who formerly denied the necessity of State intervention in their problems, that the distrust which first existed had been dispelled after only six months.

There is then a brief review of various evils and social injustices which PERON has undertaken to remedy and there are quotations from speeches of PERON intended to show his manner of surmounting the difficulties: when asked who was going to pay for the 100,000 workers' houses he had promised, his answer was, "In a country where there are so many thousands of millions of pesos there will be no lack of money to pay for the construction of 100,000 workers' homes". When asked about the salary of the peon he said, "He that has soil must till it, and if he does not have sufficient money to pay peones he should till it personally. If he is not capable of working it, let him sell it. In this respect we must be absolutely inflexible because it cannot be tolerated in any form that men continue in that situation of which we have sufficient experience".

The writer then describes the functions of the Secretary of Labor and Welfare as bringing about an equilibrium between the interests of capital, of labor and of society.

## **VI. THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE INTENTIONS OF COLONEL PERON.**

In this chapter they repeat that the revolution is not ended, it continues in the street; in the shop; in the country. The object of the revolution was not to remove certain people or political entities from office nor to put others in their place. Its origin was the disorder and it was conceived and oriented by the necessity of reestablishing the normal play of the institutions, with a straight application of the laws within democratic dogmas. When the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare was created the people did not believe in it. But PERON asked their confidence, requested their collaboration, and from the results which came out of this work, confidence was revived.

The writer says that at this time there was begun the campaign to discredit PERON. Elements who joined in this campaign were politicians out of office, voluntary exiles who wanted to be thought martyrs, and professional agitators who had lost their places of comfort and prestige among the workers. As they could not attack PERON's work, they attacked the man. They say he is a Nazi, that his social justice is of a Fascist pattern. PERON wants to be president, they say, that is why he praises the worker. Should a man be called a Nazi who assumes the responsibility of putting into action those precepts which by being human and just are the creed for nations, as set out in the Treaty of Versailles.

The writer then adds that PERON's only ambition is the just and noble one of succeeding in the work which he has begun. A soldier of high rank, there is no obstacle to his future in the army where his capacity is manifest and recognized.

For his civic virtue--concludes the writer--his noble intention, his creative capacity, the confidence awakened by his sincerity, and the elevation of his spirit, Colonel PERON has won a place in the hearts of the Argentine people who, with equal loyalty and nobility, will respond whenever called upon with the classic "Presente".

In closing the writer describes the aim of the book as "to present the truth of an intense work". He says that he has transcribed paragraphs from the speeches of Colonel PERON to demonstrate that in all of them flows the idea of social justice. He says that more has been accomplished by PERON in a matter of months than in forty years of legislation.



Lastly he affirms that he has no dependency on Colonel PERON, nor political affinity, nor personal relation.